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ABSTRACT 
This is a study about investments in the upstream oil industry. The goal is to describe how 
investments that lead to oil and gas production, are made. 
The study of oil supply is central, because it represents 60% of the world’s primary energy 
supply. It is vital for energy renewables policy makers, in order to assess oil supply 
scenarios and adjust incentives for lower fossils consumption. It is also important for 
consuming countries. Previous studies have stressed the importance of market volatility 
for investment appraisal in the UK; irreversibility of investments; and remaining reserves 
as main drivers of investment and production in the UK. 
My study differs, since my results can be compared (over decades) with a diverse 
production set in the international market: a small US company; a large company; a 
country; two regions; and OPEC. My hypothesis is that expected profit per barrel and 
market share are production and investment drivers.  
I have used the Dynamic Performance Management method, as it fits the process followed 
by managers in the oil industry. That is, focus on end results, while balancing resources 
for sustained growth. I have built and tested a dynamic model which replicates the 
production attained by the above mentioned firms, regions, and OPEC, over decades. I 
claim that expected price per barrel and market share are the drivers of investment and 
production. This study contributes to the literature in investments, petroleum and system 
dynamics, by integrating the three fields. 
 
  
 
 
                
   
iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
   
FOREWORD          I 
ABSTRACT          II 
TABLE OF CONTENTS        III 
1.  INTRODUCTION        1 
1.1 Background          1 
1.2 Method          1 
1.3 Results          1 
1.4 Conclusions          1 
1.5 Outline          1 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW                                              2 
2.1 Dynamic Performance Management (DPM)       2 
2.2 Oil Markets          3 
2.3 Oil Investments         9 
2.4 Financial Oil Markets        13 
2.5 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries      21 
3. METHODOLOGY AND SIMULATION RESULTS    23 
3.1 Rationale for Adopting Methodological Approach     23 
3.2 The Production Model and Behavior Test of Production and Investments  39 
 3.2.1 Murphy Oil        61 
 3.2.2 ExxonMobil        64 
 3.2.3 Norway region        67 
3.3 The International Demand Model and Behavior Test of Production   71 
 3.3.1 OECD region        76 
 3.3.2 Asia Pacific region       78 
 3.3.3 OPEC         80 
4. CONCLUSIONS        83 
4.1) Summary of Findings        83 
4.2) Contribution to Existing Knowledge      83 
4.3) Limitations of the Research        83 
4.4) Directions for Further Research       83 
5. REFERENCES         84 
APPENDIX: DPM of PDVSA        96 
 
 
                
   
iv 
 
Figure                                       LIST OF FIGURES                                   Page 
1 Upstream Oil Causal Diagram       7 
2 Upstream Oil Causal Diagram, Investment View     11 
3 Oil Physical and Financial Markets       18 
4 Oil Price          19 
5 Starting Production Capacity Model      39 
6 Rates response to a New Project       40 
7 Stocks Response to a New Project       41 
8 Cumulative Stocks Response       42 
9 Cumulative Stocks Response Comparison      43 
10 Net Change (end results) in Stocks (strategic resources)    44 
11 Starting Production Capacity Model with Reserves     45 
12 Reserves Response to New Project       46 
13 Production Model with Decision Process       49 
14 Capacity loss and Adjustment to Projects in Portfolio and Construction  50 
15 Production Model with Investments       51 
16 Model Response to Price to Breakeven ratio      52 
17 Financial Investment         54 
18 Murphy Oil Simulated Vs Historical Production     61 
19 Murphy Oil Simulated Vs Historical Developed Reserves     62 
20 Murphy Oil Simulated Vs Historical Cumulative Upstream Investments  62 
21 Murphy Oil Simulated Breakeven Costs      63 
22 ExxonMobil Simulated Vs Historical Production     64 
23 ExxonMobil Simulated Vs Historical Developed Reserves    65 
24 ExxonMobil Simulated Vs Historical Cumulative Upstream Investments  66 
25 Norway Simulated Vs Historical Production      67 
26 Norway Simulated Vs Historical Developed Reserves     67 
27 Norway Simulated Vs Historical Cumulative Upstream Investments   69 
28 Norway Breakeven Costs        69 
29 Demand model         73 
30 OECD Simulated Vs Historical Demand      76 
31 OECD Simulated Vs Historical Production      76 
32 Simulated Import Needs        77 
33 Asia Pacific Simulated Vs Historical Demand     78 
34 Asia Pacific Production without Correction for Capacity Loss    78 
35 Asia Pacific Simulated Vs Historical Production     79 
36 Asia Pacific Simulated Capacity Loss Adjustment     79 
37 Simulated Vs Historical Demand in OPEC Countries     80 
38 OPEC Simulated Vs Historical Production      80 
39 OPEC Production Vs International Demand      81 
 
 
 
Table                                       LIST OF TABLES                                    Page 
1 Parameters used in Production Model           70 
2 Parameters used in Production Model with International demand        82 
  
 
 
                
   
1 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background: This is a study about investments in the upstream oil industry. The goal is to 
describe how investments that lead to oil and gas production, are made. 
The study of oil supply is central, because it represents 60% of the world’s primary energy 
supply (BP, 2016). It is vital for energy renewables policy makers, in order to assess oil supply 
scenarios and adjust incentives for lower fossils consumption. It is also important for 
consuming countries; for example, OECD governments earned 50% of the total pump fuel 
price, while OPEC earned half of it, in 2015 (OPEC, 2016). Previous studies have stressed the 
importance of market volatility for investment appraisal in the UK (Favero et al., 1994); 
irreversibility of investments (Pindyck, 1994); and remaining reserves as main drivers of 
investment and production in the UK (Kemp and Kasim, 2003). 
My study differs, since my results can be compared (over decades) with a diverse production 
set in the international market: a small US company (Murphy Oil); a large company 
(ExxonMobil); a country (Norway); two regions (OECD and Asia Pacific); and OPEC. My 
hypothesis is that expected profit per barrel (as defined by the ratio of oil price to investment 
breakeven cost); and market share (as guided by international oil demand) are production and 
investment drivers.  
1.2 Method: I have used the Dynamic Performance Management method, as it fits the process 
followed by managers in the oil industry. That is, focus on end results, while balancing 
resources for sustained growth. 
1.3 Results: I have built and tested a dynamic model which replicates the production attained 
by the above mentioned firms, regions, and OPEC, over decades.  
1.4 Conclusions: I claim that expected price per barrel and market share are the drivers of 
investment and production. This study contributes to the literature in investments, petroleum 
and system dynamics, by integrating the three fields. 
1.5 Outline: Chapter 2 presents a review of DPM; oil markets and investments; financial oil 
markets; and OPEC.  In chapter III, I present the rationale for using the underlying simulation 
method for DPM (System Dynamics); then the production and investment model is presented 
and tested using a sample project; and then the six cases are simulated and analyzed. Chapter 
IV presents the conclusions.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Dynamic Performance Management (DPM)  
 
Bianchi (2012) proposes the DPM scheme to study performance and viable growth in 
organizations.  According to DPM, they possess strategic resources required to fulfill their 
goals. These resources are built over time, and they are subject to growth and depletion rates. 
Performance -end result- is then defined as the net rate of increase of strategic resources. The 
latter control drivers that impact end results. In this context, it is the duty of policy makers to 
identify the resources, drivers and end results that lead to success. They are also in charge of 
keeping resources balanced and at proper levels over time.  
DPM entails linking goals with performance measures. Products, services and relations with 
the external ambiance are defined. An internal value chain map is defined, as well. Policy 
analysis would require the upgrade structure to be made explicit. 
DPM is suited to study the upstream oil sector because unique plans and boards handle project 
portfolio, oil reserves, production capacity and financial strategic resources. Net increase of 
these resources are common measures of performance. Balanced resources enable investment 
loans and investors equity. Expected profit in investments, verified demand for production 
projects and financial reserves are main drivers of the change of strategic resources. 
 
Moreover, DPM also centers attention in the external ambiance. Its impact should not be under-
valued. Changes in regulations and rules in countries (i.e., taxes) may affect market supply and 
demand of oil. These changes may impact oil prices. The latter affects expected profit in 
investments and new projects. New projects govern production capacity and production. Thus, 
performance may be impacted by these factors beyond sterile supply and demand. In this 
research, oil upstream DPM is presented within this context shaped by global markets. 
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2.2 Oil Markets           
Oil is the world’s leading fuel. It accounts for 32.9% of global energy consumption (Dale, 
2016). Value of oil exports relative to GDP in the 12 OPEC countries amounts to 45% in the 
1986-2010 period. Oil is a source of revenues for importing countries too. In 2015, OECD 
countries charged taxes on every liter of pump fuel sold to consumers (50.4%), whereas OPEC 
producers got only 19.9% (OPEC, 2016). World oil demand is deemed to be 94 million barrels 
per day (MMBD). OECD absorbs 49% of it. China demands 11 MMBD. Middle East takes up 
8 MMB. IEA (2016) predicts world demand to be 102 MMBD for year 2021. From this 
increase, 74% is expected in Asia. Out of the 58 MMBD non-OPEC supply, OECD takes up 
41% of it. IEA (2016) predicts OECD to absorb 100% of the net demand add-ons for 
2021.OPEC supplies 36 MMBD. Saudis produce 34% of it. Iran, Iraq and the UAE are expected 
to lead OPEC’s capacity expansion. non-OECD Asia imports are almost 17 MMBD.  
It might not be easy to grasp what drives oil markets. Morse (2016) notices that except from 
China, demand add-ons in the last decade have come mainly from oil producing countries, and 
new supply has come from consuming countries. Supply risk is higher. Oil exporting countries 
face oil prices 50% below their fiscal needs. Saudis defend their market share. They do not 
lower oil output to raise prices as expected by some OPEC members. This section offers an 
outline about spot and contract oil markets and how oil is traded. Market size and prior studies 
are revealed. A causal account is given.  
 
Spot and Contract Markets: Oil is sold through term supply contracts or prompt shipment in 
the spot market. The former entails knowing the quality of crude oil; the actions to take in case 
of shipment problems, and the pricing method. Oil crudes are priced according to their quality, 
when compared to crude benchmarks. Higher crude quality than a benchmark demands higher 
price. Each type of crude has a set of refined products (i.e. gasoline) that can be obtained from 
it based on the process used to refine it. More than 150 types of crudes are traded in the world 
markets. 
WTI (West Texas Intermediate), Brent and Dubai-Oman are the major crude oil benchmarks.  
Almost all crude markets outside America and the Far East use the Brent marker. The latter is 
a mix of North Sea crude with an API gravity of 38.3 degrees and a sulfur content of only 
0.37%. It is a "sweet crude". WTI is the benchmark for crude imported to the U.S. and has an 
API gravity of 39.6 degrees and only 0.24% sulfur content.  The Dubai-Oman marker is used 
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for Middle-East Gulf crudes sold in the Asia-Pacific market, and its gravity is 31 degrees, with 
a 2% sulfur content (Fattouh; Mabro, 2006). WTI became a benchmark spot crude oil in 1983. 
It was selected as the main marker grade for the Nymex (New York Mercantile Exchange) new 
crude oil futures contract (EI, 2006).  
 
Oil Markets Models: Herce et al. (2006) focus on long-term oil investments. They discount 
short-term volatility from long-term oil price. They assess the impact on reserves value and 
assert that oil firms might incur in long term debt based on price bubbles. Two key oil market 
issues are tacit. The first is how to access oil prices since expected profit of investments 
depends on them. All oil projects need future price appraisals. The last oil price is usually taken, 
as most experts claim that prices follow a random walk, so they cannot be predicted. The second 
issue is that oil firms can get bank loans based on the level of developed reserves. These are 
reserves being produced. Hence, since new projects imply new reserves, they improve the loan 
base of firms. New reserves that result of price peaks could also be sold in the market, adding 
to cash-flow, cash stocks and assets. 
Hamilton (2008b) examines the factors responsible for changes in oil prices and concludes that 
the behavior of oil prices during 1970-1997 is influenced by vulnerabilities of oil supply to 
disruptions, the peak in the oil production in USA, and the low price elasticity of demand and 
supply in the short term.  
Naill (1972) studied the discovery cycle of gas resources using a system dynamics (SD) model.  
He assumes finite resources, and considers resource utilization goals in the short and long term. 
He tests the effects of price regulations and tax incentives on the short and medium term rates 
of gas discovery and production.  In this model, resource level impacts exploration costs. As 
resources are discovered and become reserves, costs increase. This means that operators tend 
to work with easy to discover resources first. The model also claims that a larger reserve to 
production ratio leads to additional exploration investment. This is dubious, since the oil 
industry operates on the base of projects expected profit. Hence, every project is subject to 
evaluation and only then can it influence the discovery rate. The model adds delay between 
investments and discovery rate, showing the lead time to discover reserves. The author asserts 
that, although there is abundant statistical data on these factors, the interaction of these 
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variables over time was not intuitively obvious. In summary, the model allows testing, through 
simulations, of the likely effects of alternative policies on the discovery cycle of gas resources.  
Morecroft (2007) built a model to study the long-term dynamics of the global oil industry. The 
model has five key sectors: (a) flexible OPEC producers with capacity to handle significant 
changes in production policy; (b) opportunistic OPEC producers; (c) OPEC quotas; (d) 
independent producers; and (e) price and market demand. Oil price is formed according to the 
gap between supply and demand. Demand is driven by price and GDP growth. Profit per barrel 
enables production capacity in construction, which then becomes production capacity after the 
construction time. Thus, production is enabled. Operating and capital expenditures increase as 
the level of resources decrease. 
Mashayekhi (2001) built a model to explain changes in oil prices. He suggests that when prices 
rise, liquid assets of oil exporting nations increase; their need to export oil decreases too. This 
leads to a decrease in the supply of oil and a price increase over time. However, this increase 
would reduce demand in oil importing countries. Regarding this, the depletion rate of oil fields 
is a matter of national policy. But, once investments are made, there are few incentives to 
produce oil below capacity. Even with low oil prices, oil exporting countries resist policies 
aimed at reducing production to increase price. They dispute that their market share would 
decrease. In the end, there is no certainty that such a policy would lead to an oil price increase. 
 
The upstream (exploration and production) value chain features: 
Production: Measured in barrels per day. It responds to the production capacity of the oil firm. 
Once an investment has been made in production capacity, firms tend to produce at rates nearby 
capacity. It occurs because oil wells have technical problems when used at lower capacity. 
Notice that the owner of the oil resource sets the rate at which fields are to be produced. It may 
also be in the interest of the oil firm to produce at rates lower than production capacity. This 
would be the case of OPEC members in November 2016. The objective would be a decreased 
global oil supply that could spark a price increase. 
Production Capacity: Measured in barrels per day. It accumulates the difference between the 
annual new projects that become actual production capacity and the capacity loss of oil fields. 
The former are completed projects out of the construction phase. The latter is due to damage 
or changes in the physical properties of oil wells. Production capacity is the highest level of 
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stable and economically efficient production that can be achieved from a reservoir. This under 
optimum operating conditions, with available wells connected to surface production facilities. 
Among them flow stations, gas plants, pipelines, storage tanks and flow lines. 
Production Capacity in Construction: Measured in barrels per day. It accumulates the 
difference between new projects being built and those that become actual production capacity. 
It takes years to develop oil wells and start commercial operation.  Capacity is then stabilized, 
most probably with new investments, before the abandonment phase is reached. Technical 
advances have reduced some oil shale projects lead time to months. 
 
Oil Reserves: The amount of oil barrels deemed to exist in oil fields is called reserves. They 
are called developed when they are ready for production. New production capacity projects, 
then, develop reserves. The amount depends on the expected exploitation time of the oil field. 
Hence, developed reserves accumulate the difference between new reserves arising out of the 
new production capacity, and production.   
 
New Capacity in Construction: Measured in barrels per day per year. They arise out of the 
investment decision process. This, in turn, depends on expected oil prices. Variations in prices 
lead to variations in projects under construction. Changes in the later impact new developed 
reserves and production capacity. This leads to diverse production rates. Hence, these 
fluctuations influence revenues. Also, production impacts global supply, and then again, oil 
prices. 
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Figure 1, Upstream Oil Causal Diagram 
Upstream investments are split into new production capacity projects, exploration efforts, and 
acquisition of assets and reserves. The investment process is fully assessed in the next section. 
Performance is measured (end results) as the rates of new capacity in construction, new 
reserves, new developed reserves and new production capacity. Reserves are split into 
undeveloped and developed. The latter being the result of the construction and setup process. 
The whole process is triggered (driven) by the investment evaluation process. Oil firms must 
balance the four strategic resources in order to cope with their production strategy. The 
resources are: production capacity in construction, production capacity, undeveloped reserves, 
and developed reserves. These in turn must be balanced with the financial resources. 
Balancing resources is of the essence because lead times for production capacity might take 
years. At the same time, capacity loss begins after production starts. Developed reserves are 
depleted by production. Physical properties of oil fields, maintenance and recovery techniques 
impact capacity loss. Moreover, projects are executed in distinct countries. Not all producing 
reserves are developed by the same oil firms. They may buy them from other firms. They may 
 
 
                
   
8 
 
also buy undeveloped reserves. All of this to keep a smooth production schedule that may 
enable them to commit to oil demand. 
 
Notice the two major feedback loops in Figure 1. The first is the investments enabled by cash 
loop. Higher production leads to more revenues and cash assets. New investments are made. 
Projects are built. This leads to higher production. The second is the constrained investments 
balancing loop. Since production depletes developed reserves, upstream assets decrease. A 
weaker balance sheet may not allow proper funding of projects, leading to lower investments. 
This, in turn, leads to lower production and revenues. As seen, it is not enough to balance the 
four strategic resources mentioned above. They must be balanced with financial resources. 
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2.3 Oil Investments           
 
Beyond profit, research offers three main factors that impact investments: demand growth 
given by global GDP; legal context where restrictions and changes in exploitation regimes 
create uncertainty about licensing and fiscal terms that may constrain investments (Hvozdyk 
and Mercer Blackman, 2010; Penrose, 2009; Kochhar et al., 2005); and financial situation of 
the host country, where desired spending is believed to create pressure for oil revenues.  
 
Changes in oil prices may create uncertainty, lowering investments (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
Feasible oil reserves, services and tools may impact notion of growth. Patent rights, high costs 
of entry into new areas and OPEC spare capacity might act as obstacles to projects. Local 
content needs with increasing costs, refined products subsidies prices and higher country tax 
take may reduce them too (Penrose, 2009; Dada, 2006; Hvozdyk and Mercer Blackman, 2010). 
 
Regarding profit motives, Keynes (1936; Eklund, 2013) and Fisher (1930; Eklund, 2013) stated 
that investments are made until the present value of expected future revenues, at the margin, 
equals the opportunity cost of capital. Keynes did not look at it as a stability seeking process. 
Fisher saw it as an optimal capital stock process. Penrose (2009) argued that growth follows 
prospects to increase long run profits, while paying dividends. Jorgenson (1967) asserted that 
the goal of asset accretion is to maximize present value. Hvozdyk and Mercer Blackman (2010) 
claim that investments increase with higher expected price of oil. 
 
From a financial stance, Penrose (2009) affirmed that the cash reserves needed for investments 
are linked to how the firm has built up (or depleted) its funds. They are also thought to be linked 
to the way it has used its credit. Marcel (2006; Hvozdyk and Mercer Blackman, 2010) claims 
that NOC´s investments are quite linked to the host state´s policies. Eller et al. (2007, Hvozdyk 
and Mercer Blackman, 2010) assert that the financial status of NOC´s and their investments 
may be impaired because of their dual role of oil producers and wealth purveyors. Further 
constrains to NOC´s investments come as effect of ceding cash flow to national budgets 
through gas subsidies (Hvozdyk and Mercer Blackman, 2010).  Martinez and Ferrando (2008) 
state that cash flow and debt burden are key in explaining capital outlays. 
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Timing plays a crucial role. Robinson (1953) observed that present value may be altered by 
events that occur within the time gap between outlays and profits. Jorgenson (1967) stated that 
the feasible outlay rate may depend on the choice time of investors. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
claim that most investments share three aspects: a degree of irreversibility, uncertainty about 
future rewards, and flexibility in timing to get data; they also notice that delays matter, and that 
the present value approach should include the cost of keeping the option alive. Senge (1978) 
adds inventory, backlog and supply line corrections; as well as expectations forming and delays 
in the capital ordering process. Moxnes (1982) specifies desired state spending as driver of 
desired oil production, which leads to investments. 
 
Market share is of the essence. Buzzell et al. (1975) found positive correlation between return 
on investment (ROI) and market share. They suggest that higher market power raises clout in 
market prices. Bloom and Kotler (1975) contend that higher market share implies greater risks 
as well, hinging on the resources of the other parties, which may set up competing coalitions. 
They argue that the optimal market share has been attained when departure from it – in any 
direction – could decrease long run profits or increase risks. 
 
Oil firms tend to invest based on oil prices. They are used to assess future cash flows in projects. 
In a study by investment bank Lehman Brothers in mid-2005, with rising oil prices, oil firms 
planned to invest USD 192 billion in exploration and production. This amount was more than 
twice the amount six months earlier (EI, 2006). According to a recent study by the energy 
consultancy Wood Mackenzie, USD 400 billion of investments on new oil and gas projects 
have been cut since mid-2014, due to the 50% oil price collapse (FT, 2016). 
The upstream (exploration and production) financial value chain features: 
Cash and Equivalents: Measured in USD. It accumulates the difference between inflows and 
outflows. The former includes revenues collection and new debt. The latter includes actual 
payment of investments, production costs, debt repayment and interests. It also includes 
payment of commitments, taxes, royalties and dividends. New debt is enabled by feasible new 
debt. The latter is a fraction of indicated investments, as most projects include debt loans. The 
feasible fraction depends on the financial assessment made by banks. The ratio of upstream 
assets to liabilities is a good example. 
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Debt and Liabilities: Measured in USD. It accumulates the difference between new debt and 
liabilities and their payments. High values of this stock relative to upstream assets lead to 
reduced feasible bank loans. This may constrain investments and production. 
Upstream Assets:  Measured in USD. It aggregates cash and equivalents, new investments and 
the assessed value of developed reserves. High values of it relative to debt and liabilities lead 
to higher feasible bank loans.  
 
 
Figure 2. Upstream Investments  
 
Desired investments arise out of proved reserves, expected profit, intended market share, and 
expected demand. In the case of NOC’s, desired fiscal spending matters too. A fraction of 
investments is financed with debt. However, the new amount of debt feasible depends, mainly, 
on how the company has used and accrued its liquid assets. The latter emerge from the link 
between upstream assets and the stocks of debt and liabilities. 
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Investments are driven by free funds and cash flow. The unique type of reserves rules the oil 
fields development strategy. Diverse oil fields have varied exploitation time spans, production 
schedules and depletion curves. New investments take time to become new production 
capacity. Taxes, royalties, dividends, and operating charges drain the funds of oil firms and 
constrain investments in new capacity. Some NOC´s (i.e. PDVSA) deplete the cash stock at a 
higher rhythm than others; hence, delay investments to the point of not being able to maintain 
production capacity and production. The investments enabled by cash reinforcing loop reveals 
that accrued funds enable new projects that increase production capacity, production and 
revenues, further increasing funds again. 
It is critical to keep a balanced level of cash and equivalents stock. Oil firms must have proper 
control of dividends, debt, and liabilities. These factors drain the stock of cash and equivalents. 
Decreasing funds lead to lower production capacity. The short term loop in charge of producing 
this effect is dormant under prudent financial management. However, when the funds allotted 
to pay for investments fall below the required value, the payment of investments rate decline. 
This leads to a higher time to pay investment invoices, above the normal 90 days. Construction 
time may increase, and as a result, new production capacity is delayed. Production may be 
reduced. Capacity loss rate might increase too, as a result of lower budget for maintenance of 
oil wells and enhanced production techniques. This may lower production even more. These 
effects add up to delays in new projects.  
The link from proved developed reserves to feasible new debt is backed by empirical evidence. 
Lenders may assess a fraction of these reserves as assets for lending purposes. This leads to 
higher investments. Investment timing relative to oil prices is crucial. Oil firms may invest 
cyclically or counter cyclically relative to the rhythm of oil prices. The new production capacity 
created would diverge in both cases. The net present value (NPV) approach would suggest 
investments directly linked to high oil price expectations; oil companies may decide to wait for 
further information, or use a counter cyclical investment process taking into account the ups 
and downs of oil prices.  
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2.4 Financial Oil Markets           
 
Upstream processes involve risk. Beyond exploration risks, oil price or market risk is critical. 
Oil prices have swung between USD 29 and USD 145 between 2008 and 2016. Changes in oil 
prices induce cash flow variations. Low prices may impact expected bankruptcy. This may give 
reasons to equity holders to under invest in the oil firm. Producers face the risk of lower oil 
prices in the future. This entails lower revenues, impacting operations, investments, and 
dividends. On the other side (downstream), crude oil refiners face a contrary risk: high oil 
prices. This happens because refiners input is crude oil, which is used to make refined products 
(i.e., gasoline).  
Oil markets have faced severe swings, including: the crisis in the Suez Canal in 1956; price 
shocks in 1973, 1974 and 1979; the collapse of prices in 1986 and 2014; the Exxon Valdez 
accident; and the Gulf crisis (Foster, 1994). It is though that volatility of oil prices is the main 
problem.  
Derivative contracts are financial tools that are valued according to the worth of an underlying 
asset. Unlike stocks, they do not give the owner a right of property in the reference asset. The 
benchmark asset can be a commodity (i.e. oil), local or foreign currency, bonds, shares, notes, 
securities, etc. For example, a refiner may enter into a forward contract to buy oil in the future; 
dodging swings in oil prices; as well as storage costs. These contracts lay out the type, quality 
and volume of oil to be shipped; as well as when and where the shipment will be made. They 
also define a price or pricing formula. These private contracts allow both the seller and buyer, 
to reduce uncertainty linked to oil prices in the future. This may lead to better planning of 
commercial and financial activities. Forwards are traded in OTC markets (Chique 2014). 
As in forwards, in future contracts the parties agree to trade oil at a price set in the contract, at 
a future date. However, parties do not transact directly, and oil barrels are seldom shipped. 
They connect through a formal exchange. For example, a producer wishing to sell a crude oil 
contract in June can sell a thousand WTI (West Texas Intermediate) barrels contract to a refiner, 
in NYMEX (New York Mercantile Exchange). The price and amounts traded in June are 
public; they help put in motion the offers to buy and sell (bid, ask). If the price in June goes 
below the agreed price, the producer profits if he sold the contract. If the price is higher than 
the agreed price, the refiner profits if he bought the contract. This is a zero sum game. If the 
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buyer of the contract opts out, he can do it by selling a contract for June, in the same amount, 
at the prevailing price. The contrary applies to the seller. Since the buyer has bought and sold 
a futures contract for June, he has fulfilled its duties to the Exchange (Chique 2014). 
Over the counter (OTC) trades are mostly private, tailored contracts. Along with forwards and 
futures, they relate to the spot market. They are thought to reflect market conditions. They 
attract firms that handle contracts with alike crudes, or those who wish to trade in the same 
region. These contracts support risk analysis and mitigation efforts (hedging). They also attract 
speculation (EI, 2006). Some analysts call speculation to the fact that some holders of futures 
contracts do not have a commercial interest in the real barrel of oil and then their only interest 
is speculative. 
Swaps, which are traded OTC, involve the exchange of cash flows for a period of time, against 
a fixed price. For example, an oil producer wishing to receive a fixed income for a given 
volume of oil barrels, may enter into a swap contract. The producer would pay for changes in 
spot oil price relative to an agreed index. He would receive the agreed fixed price, thus netting 
the swap with the income gotten in the cash market.  This may lead to better control over oil 
income.  
Options, also traded in exchanges, offer the option buyer (holder) the right but not the 
obligation to buy (call option) or sell (put option) a volume of oil barrels at an agreed “strike” 
price, at a future “expiry” date. As in futures, oil barrels are seldom shipped. The buyer pays a 
premium to the seller (writer) for this right. Hence, if the price at the expiry date goes over the 
strike price, the buyer profits if he holds a call. If the price is lower than the strike price, the 
buyer profits if he holds a put. When there is no profit from the option, the buyer just does not 
exert it. In all cases the writer receives the premium from the holder. Oil producers may prefer 
to hold put options when facing low oil prices because they lower the value of their “long” 
positions in the “cash” markets, like inventories, raising risk. Oil refiners may prefer to hold 
call options when facing high oil prices as they raise their costs, raising risk (Chique 2014).   
Oil producers may also use options based “collars”. They offer shelter against lower prices and 
profits above a threshold price.  The producer sets up two options. The first is a put at a strike 
price (floor price) lower than the current oil trading price. This is called an “out of the money” 
put that protects against prices below the strike price. The second is a call at a strike price 
(ceiling price) that is higher than the current oil trading price. This is an “out of the money” 
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call that gives profits when prices are above the strike price. Prices between the ceiling and the 
floor are in the loss area for the producer, where no wins are possible, and no options are 
exerted. The producer is only liable for the premium paid for both options.  
These markets attract liquidity.  They offer readings on the changing value of future supply, 
impacting oil trading, which occurs at a premium or discount to the spot barrels. The future 
value of a benchmark is related to the current level of inventories of crude oil; the cost of 
storage, and perceptions about future supply and demand. Prices are in "contango" when the 
futures price is higher than the spot. They are in "backwardation" when the futures price is 
lower than the spot (EI, 2006). 
Volatility in the price of oil upholds futures markets, able to offer market players means to 
adjust their risk profile. All of this without coping with real trading of oil barrels; its production, 
processing, transportation, storage, or shipment. Trading, then, happens in "paper"; its low cost 
is based on standard contracts, and pre specified volume, quality and date of maturity. Thus, 
futures markets offer low transaction costs and high transparency; perhaps because the volume 
of contracts relative to real supply is high.  Also, the investment needed to meet future margin 
calls is small relative to the economic value of the oil volume defined in the contract, granting 
high leverage (Foster, 1994). 
Agents willing to take risks are essential to close these contracts. Speculators play this role by 
promoting market liquidity by trading frequently. Trading may take place in exchanges (i.e. 
NYMEX) where set contracts are offered, overseen by the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC). They may also occur in OTC markets, where contracts are dealt between 
private parties.  
Commercial agents include both producers and consumers. Non commercial agents include 
speculators, banks and funds in search of profits on short term changes in prices. Both types of 
agents are needed in the exchange. In essence, hedging demands same amount counter 
positions in the cash and futures markets. It is the mix of both that may lower the risk exposure 
of the hedger.  
Oil producers are said to be long because they carry inventories. They may protect against the 
risk of falling prices by selling (short) oil futures contracts in NYMEX.  If prices fall, they can 
offset the loss in value of their production with the profits in the futures markets. If prices rise, 
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the higher value of production can be used to offset the loss incurred with the "paper" barrels. 
In both cases the producers have higher certainty with respect to the future income.  
An oil producer that wants to secure a price of 50 USD per barrel for 2 million barrels in March, 
might take a “short” stance in NYMEX. So, if the WTI price in March is, for example, 45 USD 
per barrel, it would profit 10 USD million (5 USD per barrel). This profit can then be used to 
offset the loss in the “cash” market, since the price shielded inventory has dropped its value in 
the same amount. If the WTI price in March is, for example, 53 USD per barrel, it would lose 
6 USD million (3 USD per barrel). This loss can be offset by the profit in the “cash” market, 
since the price shielded inventory raised its value in the same amount.  
The stance taken by this producer needs liquidity. These funds are most often granted by non 
commercial agents. They which might take the risk of going “long” when the producer goes 
“short”. They would lose money when the WTI price goes lower than 50 USD per barrel. They 
would profit when the WTI price goes higher than 50 USD per barrel. Notice, though, that 
another commercial agent (an oil refiner) could have taken the long stance, because refiners 
face the risk of crude oil price increases. In this case the oil refiner would have got the same 
results than the non commercial agent.  
Several studies have been made to address hedging related issues in the oil industry, using data 
sets based on the 1311 industrial classification code in the U.S., which identifies oil and gas 
companies involved in operations, services, exploration, production, drilling, completing and 
equipping wells, and oil and gas preparation. Notice that a current search of companies in this 
category yields results that include upstream and downstream companies, whether they are 
integrated or not (Chique 2014). 
Pincus and Rajgopal (2000), study 139 firms in the period 1993-1996. They find that oil and 
gas firms sampled use forwards 44%, swaps 33%, futures 13%, and options 10% of firm years. 
Jin and Jorion (2004) study 119 companies in the period 1998 and 2001. They affirm financial 
distress is the reason for hedging 33% of next year´s production on average. They also maintain 
that 45% of firms in their sample hedged in the period. Mnasri et al. (2013) study 150 US oil 
and gas producers in the period 1998-2010. They maintain that investments and financial 
constraints are hedging motives. Kumar and Rabinovitch (2013) claim that hedging is driven 
by financial distress. Smistad and Pustylnick (2012) verify that firms claim not to speculate 
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with derivatives; they also confirm that all of them try it to a certain degree. Hedging tools used 
were swaps, collars, futures and forward contracts. 
Haushalter (2000) studies 100 oil and gas companies in the period 1992-1994. He upholds a 
clear link between hedging and leverage; that is, between the fraction of production hedged 
and the debt to total assets ratio. This study verifies that hedging helps a firm to get the funds 
needed to pursue investment projects. It also ratifies that hedging helps to sustain cash flows, 
while reducing the prospect of a default. Acharya et al. (2010) study the futures market using 
limits to arbitrage. They use data from 525 oil and gas production, refining and service firms. 
In their model, speculators have capital constraints. They maintain that these limits to arbitrage 
translate into limits to hedging by producers. 
Hence, hedging policy protects a fraction of assets or expected income. This, in order to insure 
available funds for capital outlays and operating expenses. Large funds may help reduce the 
payment time of liabilities. Leading to lower chance of financial distress. Hedging may enable 
growth and enhance sustainability.  
 
Other authors inspect the links between the financial and physical oil markets. Pindyck (2001), 
inspects oil cash and storage markets. The author unveils links between spot and futures prices, 
production and inventories. The study supports the notion that volatility of oil prices impacts 
risk strategies of oil firms. The IMF (2008) tried to find causality between investments by non 
commercial agents and oil prices, or the contrary. The study did not find the desired causality. 
Dees et al. (2007) maintain that much of the increase in oil prices in the 2004-2006 period can 
be linked to contango. Two vital factors emerge from this study. First, the authors support that 
expectations of investors about the state of the oil markets shape their behavior. Second, the 
authors uphold that production capacity takes years to build. Slopek and Reitz (2008) study oil 
prices in the 1986-2006 period. They argue that technical agents impact price formation by 
forecasting past data. This would be a kind of "positive" feedback which attempts to reinforce 
the observed trend. They claim that fundamentalist agents expect prices to converge towards 
the long run equilibrium value. This would be a kind of "negative" feedback which attempts to 
balance the observed trend towards equilibrium. Foster (1994), asserts that the causality 
between the oil spot and futures prices may be impacted by institutional quality and market 
structure. 
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Figure 3, Oil Physical and Financial Markets 
 
The figure depicts links between the physical and futures oil markets. It is assumed that non 
commercial agents do passive opposing trades to commercial agents. Since oil users (i.e. 
refiners) face the risk of high oil prices, they react to contango. Hedging the risk of price (cost) 
increases implies buying new long contracts in the exchange, which may reinforce the initial 
contango. 
 
Oil producers react to low prices. A decreasing price gap (basis), would be a signal that their 
future income could be lower than expected and required. The hedging response calls for new 
short trades (selling of contracts) that end up reinforcing the initial condition. Notice that the 
actions of these commercial agents should be related to the price risk actually faced; this 
requires aligning hedging efforts to the funds required to maintain cash flow and investments. 
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The activity of technical traders (those that follow trading patterns) is represented by the two 
speculative reinforcing loops. As the futures price goes up, technical traders may buy more 
contracts. When the price goes down, they may sell more contracts. 
 
Contango may also trigger profit motives: greater demand of oil barrels and decisions to hold 
inventory, both to profit from the higher oil price in the future. Higher demand may balance 
contango by lowering inventories and increasing the spot price. Holding inventories reinforces 
contango by not decreasing them, avoiding a lower spot price. 
 
A major loop linking the physical and futures oil markets may arise out of expected supply 
restrictions. In this balancing loop, a higher futures price may prompt contango profit trading 
that lowers inventories and increases spot price. New production may be set up, reducing 
commercial users risk of high prices. This may lower the number of contracts bought, and the 
futures price. Notice that this loop goes around the slow production capacity set up process; 
however, lead times vary greatly in the oil industry. 
 
Figure 4, Oil Price 
Spot and contract oil prices are driven by supply and demand. Cost of carry includes storage 
cost plus interests paid in the contract period. Bid and ask prices depend also on changes in 
inventories. In between, two pairs of feedback loops are of the essence. Traders, when contango 
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is beyond the cost of carry, may try to buy oil barrels, and sell futures contracts. This, ideally, 
would entail a risk free profit, since the basis is high enough to earn a profit. Buying barrels 
for storage increases inventory. This tends to lower price, and make the basis even bigger. This 
contango reinforcing loop may lead to inventory increase and lower spot price. Traders at the 
same time, may act on the futures markets. They may sell short contracts lowering the ask 
price, the futures price, and the basis. This contango loop balances towards backwardation. 
 
Also, traders have motives to sale oil from inventory in backwardation. But, at the same time, 
they may enter into long contracts in the futures markets. As a result, inventory drops and spot 
price raises. Backwardation is reinforced. At the same time, the futures bid price increases, and 
the futures price too, balancing towards contango.  
 
The loops depicted may reinforce or balance price fluctuations. Price anchors subject to this 
are the oil price given by supply and demand and the price given by expectations. The latter 
may be driven by changes in GDP, demand and supply. Current spot price could act as anchor 
too. From this view, then, oil price is shaped by expectations, perceived supply and demand, 
and changes in inventories. However, Traders in search for profit or price shields impact 
realized spot and futures prices. There may be limits to their actions too. Funds available for 
trading depend also on the return of spot and future markets relative to other commodities. This 
implies that funds may not be available to trade in full as indicated, and the full arbitrage 
process may take longer than expected. That is, adjustment times may longer. 
 
As described, this causal account depicts actions by traders acting in both spot and futures 
markets at the same time. However, it may subject to swings brought about by momentum or 
technical traders that may amplify price moves up or down. This may happen because they 
tend to buy futures when prices are going up, and sell them when prices are going down. Further 
swings may arise, as investment funds may trade futures as a portfolio diversification strategy, 
without trading on the physical side. 
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2.5 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries       
 
OPEC acts within the oil spot, contract and futures markets context defined above. Among its 
goals we find long term petroleum revenues for members; fair and stable prices; its share of 
world oil supply; the stability of the world oil market; and the security of a regular supply to 
consumers (OPEC-LTS, 2010). However, securing a steady income to producers has not been 
an easy task. A study by Drollas (2003) reveals that OPEC average export revenues swung 
between 422 and 163 USD billion (constant 2001 US$) between 1973 and 2002. Exports as a 
percentage of production decreased from 92% to 60% from 1960 to 2015. 
Yet, reliance on oil has raised in spite of higher revenues. It has also led to larger spending 
pledges. OPEC’s current account surplus 1974 and 1980 (69 and 111 USD billion) was gone 
by 1978 and 1982. Saudi Arabia ran both a budget and a foreign exchange deficit; massive 
imports of goods and services and spending in foreign currency are thought to be liable. This 
backs the view of OPEC exporters as highly indebted firms (IMF, 1986; Adelman, 1986). This 
view has recent support as the negative current account balance of Saudi Arabia for 2015 and 
2016 is estimated at 3.5 % and 4.7% of GDP; and their fiscal break even oil price is estimated 
at 100 $/barrel (IMF-REO, 2015). 
OPEC studies: Its production behavior has been studied in detail. Griffin (1985; Brémond et 
al., 2011) proposes partial market sharing as the best fitted model for OPEC. Hnyilicza and 
Pindyck (1976) split OPEC in two groups, (savers and spenders); the spenders with an instant 
need for cash and rate of discount lower than the savers. Both groups with diverse bargaining 
power. 
There is also the OPEC dynamic pricing power dimension; that which allowed for cohesive 
output cuts and oil price upturn from 10 to 23 USD per barrel from 1998 to 1999; that which 
has needed distinct models to explain diverse events (Fattouh and Mahadeva, 2013).  
 
Saudi Arabia’s role within OPEC is of special concern. It tends to maintain plenty of spare 
capacity; and its production is negatively correlated with that of other OPEC producers. This 
has led to models with Saudi Arabia as a distinct producer (Fattouh and Mahadeva, 2013). In 
this line of research, Griffin and Neilson (1994; Fattouh and Mahadeva, 2013) affirm that Saudi 
Arabia has opted to punish members for producing above their quotas. As in 1998, when Saudi 
Arabia is thought to have replied to Venezuela’s higher output by increasing its own output. 
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Saudi Arabia’s and other OPEC members’ exports sway at a similar rhythm during “normal” 
times. That is, the correlation is 0.7 when there are no supply disruptions. However, it is 
negative during supply disruptions. This implies that when demand declines, both Saudis and 
rest of OPEC reduce exports. When rest of OPEC exports are interrupted, Saudis increase 
exports (Alkhathlan et al., 2014). Haltwinger and Harrington (1991; Fattouh and Mahadeva, 
2013) assert that incentives to produce beyond what has been agreed increase when demand 
expectations are falling. Hence, it is harder to maintain collusion under falling demand. In any 
case, there may be limits to OPEC investment strategy; its exports as a fraction of production 
have gone from 92% to 60% in the 1960-2015 period. OPEC’s challenge is to have a smaller 
consumption to increase export revenue (Aissaoui, 2015). 
 
Cremer and Weitzman (1979; Al-Roomy, 1987) modeled OPEC with production costs based 
on the cumulative reserves extracted. Fringe producers are price takers that follow OPEC price 
signals. However, the oil demand was assumed to be linear, growing over time. The concept 
of costs increasing with cumulative production is in sync with oil operations where firms 
usually extract the low cost barrels first. There may be a great difference between the number 
of oil wells a large firm may have, and the number of active wells. This happens since wells 
are only profitable under certain conditions. 
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3. METHODOLOGY AND SIMULATION RESULTS  
 
3.1 Rationale for Adopting Methodological Approach  
 
The System Dynamics (feedback thought) method is used in this research. Yet, most oil 
markets studies use the equilibrium paradigm. Both paradigms are presented. Then, we inspect 
both methods for modeling oil market issues, since they may lead to different problem 
framings. 
 
Introducing the equilibrium paradigm: 
It refers to the price stability that is alleged to arise out of the joint balance of market supply 
and demand. As asserted, this leads to the efficient allocation of goods and services. The U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE, 2005) model uses this method. It is used for midterm projections 
through 2030. The Model used by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2014) uses this 
method too. It is used to project scenarios for their world energy outlook. 
 
The IMF (Pesenti, 2008) uses general equilibrium (in diverse markets) models. They study 
production, consumption and oil trading. This model serves as base for the Bank of Canada´s 
(Elekdag et al., 2007) study of shocks driving oil prices. It assumes perfect competition and 
long run equilibrium. The Norges Bank (Golombek et al., 2014) uses an equilibrium based 
model to study oil markets.  
 
Research on oil markets: Extant model based research about oil market has been done.  This 
outline presents models according to purpose and method used.  
 
Model purpose: Al-Qahtani et al. (2008) present more than 50 models for oil market studies. 
They include oil prices, OPEC´s behavior and other topics. Oil price is one of the most vital 
market topics. Thus, most of the studies refer to it. 
 
Topics on oil prices include:  price response to changes in the actions of economic agents; price 
swings due to market share policies of OPEC´s members; OPEC´s production quotas impact 
on price; OPEC´s production capacity impact on price; projections of supply, demand and oil 
prices; short term price elasticity; optimal price paths to maximize surplus by producers and 
consumers, and the net present value of income and reserves. 
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Among OPEC´s topics we have: Cartel and competitive behavior; impact of taxes on OPEC; 
Cartel´s stability and optimal price paths; and optimal production to cover the call on OPEC. 
Other topics include oil demand forecast; mid and long term trends in oil markets; and the 
appraisal of utility for OPEC and non OPEC producers.  
 
Method used: According to Huntington et al. (2013), models are classified depending on the 
method used: structural, computational, and reduced form or financial models.  
 
Structural models use economic theories about the goals, constraints, and behavior of market 
players. They provide the root for formulas where players relate to the market. Each sector in 
the model is often based on economic, political, or rule of thumb mechanisms. They usually 
focus on a single market (for example, generic world crude oil supply) with few agents or 
players (for example, OPEC and oil firms). 
 
The oil market model by Dées et al. (2007) is an example of the structured approach. The 
authors present a model of the world oil market. The key premise is that the coefficients 
represent the long run link among variables (equilibrium). They assert the model can be used 
to analyze oil market changes and risks. The model, built in 20015, is composed of several 
equations that are computed each quarter, in the period 1995 to 2001. The main exogenous 
variables (those that while being independent, affect the model behavior, without being 
affected by it) are: OECD oil stock; OPEC production capacity; oil production costs; and OPEC 
quota. The main endogenous variables (those linked by equations within the model) are: oil 
demand; non OPEC oil production; oil price; and OPEC production. For example, the formula 
to compute the OPEC production is:  
 
OPEC oil production =  total oil demand + variation in OECD oil stocks 
 – (Non OPEC oil production + production of non-gas liquids + refining gain) 
 
Their conclusion is that the model generates fairly accurate past prices. This model is thought 
to capture changes in oil supply and demand that have caused real oil prices to swing over the 
last two decades. Their tests suggest that non OPEC supply is rather inelastic to changes in 
price. 
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Computational models allow much detail, as they use extensive computing resources. For 
example, refining capacity in Europe, refined products in a region, oil inventories at country 
level, several producers and multiple qualities of crude oil.  The underlying logic of these 
models is the search for partial or full general equilibrium with other energy or other sectors in 
the economy. Both modeling approaches, the structural and the computational, provide 
explanations about the determinants of markets and oil price behavior, with emphasis on the 
long term.  
 
As an example of the computational approach, we present the National Energy Modeling 
System (NEMS). It was developed by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). This 
agency is responsible for official energy information used by the federal government. This 
large scale model contains numerous modules (and more than fifteen hundred equations). 
Within NEMS, the Oil and Gas Supply Module (OGSM) is used for projections of reserves 
and production of crude oil and natural gas at the regional and national level. There are two 
key assumptions in the OGSM; the first is that drilling for oil and gas is projected using the 
expected net present value of the drilling efforts. The second is that the model must be able to 
pass tests for “orderly” futures and “disorderly” ones; that is, constant drilling activity around 
an equilibrium level, and fluctuations around equilibrium (NEMS Conference Proceedings, 
1993). 
 
Reduced form or financial models center their attention, mainly, on short or midterm oil price 
formation; with less account of market behavior than the structural and computational 
approaches. They have become more popular given the impact that financial motives, markets 
and institutions have on commodity and oil trading. They attempt to unveil the behavior of the 
financial markets, and predict futures prices and volatility. They often focus on oil price and 
its time series properties. These models are based on linear and nonlinear time series, and use 
statistical relations between oil prices and other variables. Vector auto-regression (VAR) is the 
most conspicuous representative of this approach; its relevant feature is the premise that past 
values have an effect on the current value. Thus, future values are estimated based on a 
weighted sum of past values.  This method is used to forecast inter related time series; and for 
the impulse response analysis of a system of variables. The structured vector auto regression 
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(SVAR) enhances the VAR approach by adding elements of the structural models; hence, 
allowing for better economic explanations. 
 
Among these reduced form or financial models, we find ARMA, a single variable, auto 
regressive moving average model. It may capture the time variation of a time series, and use it 
to forecast future prices. This model is also used to represent random walk processes derived 
from the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). It assumes that price changes are just “pure 
noise”, and that no player can outperform the market. ARMA models can also serve as the base 
to imply a mean reverting process; in which case oil prices converge to a long-term equilibrium, 
at a speed specified in the model. This framework is supported by Pindyck (1999) who asserts 
that “non-structural forecasting models should incorporate mean reversion to a stochastically 
fluctuating trend line. That trend line reflects long-run (total) marginal cost, which is 
unobservable”.  
 
 
Epistemology in the research on oil markets: A sample of models used for oil market 
research has been assessed. Diverse purposes and methods have been laid out. Now, questions 
are made to help us grasp the criteria used to justify this knowledge. 
 
Which paradigm do they depart from? 
 
Let´s first take a look at some of the findings in this review of models of oil market research: 
 
The claim that the coefficients estimated, by using a model, represent the long-run relationship 
among the variables. This may be read as: there is an underlying, pre-determined equilibrium 
towards which the relation between variables must converge.  A suggestion to model oil prices 
using two components: a mean reversion process where prices converge to an assumed long 
term equilibrium; and a fluctuating component. A study where a key assumption is that the 
model must be able to pass tests for “orderly” futures and “disorderly” ones; that is, constant 
drilling activity around an equilibrium level, and fluctuations around equilibrium. The usage 
of random walk processes derived from the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). The 
assumption that price changes are just “pure noise”, and that no player can outperform the 
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market. In some studies, though, the methods used allow past values to have an effect on current 
value. 
 
There seems to be a focus on equilibrium, and, how is it justified? 
 
Richey (2005) asserts that market equilibrium is justified by its efficiency in allocating scarce 
resources and capital supply. It arises out of the aggregation of supply and demand. His thesis 
is that “equilibrium is well-enshrined in the philosophical and economic literature as the basis 
by which individual activity (whether corporate, institutional, or otherwise, and always 
satisfying all assumptions of competitive equilibrium), driven by self-interest qua profit 
motive, leads to an efficient outcome for the system as a whole”. 
 
Looking at the salient features of this review, we may see that, as Richey (2005) claims, 
commodity (oil) prices are optimal, regulated endogenously to the market system, and they 
tend to equilibrium. The assumption that oil production (or drilling activity that enables it) 
should be modeled around an equilibrium level leads to the maximally efficiently attainable. 
 
However, not all the modeling approaches analyzed conform to the claim made by Richie 
(2005) that the self-adjustment of markets to their equilibrium point is always instantaneous. 
Modelers may consider allowing for the adjustment process to take some time. The other reason 
brought in by Richey (2005) is that markets “know best”; that is, they show a collective 
rationality that beats the available information or knowledge by any agent.  
 
The observed claims, are in some way, nearby the search for certainty that typifies natural 
sciences. They could be compared with the view that the search for constant or perfect 
relationships should not be the target of economics (Mises, 2003). According to him, this 
knowledge is not quantitatively definite.  
 
Given this, is instantaneous equilibrium possible?  
 
Mises (2003), who is thought to interpret the economy as the science of “human actions”, 
asserted that action distinguishes between the present and the future; he stated that it takes time 
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to go from one to the other, and therefore, all changes could only be felt, or perceived, over a 
period of time.  
 
This may have led him to claim that certain time must pass before a new equilibrium is 
achieved, hence, equilibrium could not be reached immediately. This could have provided 
insights to the view that general equilibrium should not be applied to problems regarding 
capital; given the time lag between the moment when the decision is made to order capital and 
the moment when it arrives. 
 
The introduction of time in the equilibrium issue brings new questions. If we depart from 
actions that take time, there is a gap between the moment when a decision to act is made and 
the moment when, ceteris paribus, the desired action is accomplished. What happens if the 
conditions that exist when the action is accomplished are different than we assessed? What are 
the underlying assumptions behind the equilibrium design features in the oil models surveyed? 
 
The answer might be found in Simon (1955) who expressed that “Traditional economic theory 
postulates an 'economic man', who, in the course of being 'economic' is also 'rational'. This man 
is assumed to have knowledge of the relevant aspects of his environment which, if not 
absolutely complete, is at least impressively clear and voluminous. He is assumed also to have 
a well-organized and stable system of preferences, and a skill in computation that enables him 
to calculate, for the alternative courses of action that are available to him, which of these will 
permit him to reach the highest attainable point on his preference scale. “. 
 
It could be argued, though, that decisions could be irrational if results are not optimal, then. 
But, if decision makers are confronted with not only time lags for actions to come true, but also 
with unexpected events that might arise in the ambiance, could decisions still be tagged as 
irrational? Mises (2003) asserts that this is not the case. He states that they just don´t have the 
correct information, and that if they had it, they would decide differently. He goes further and 
states that “Only a perfect being, whose omniscience and omnipresence would enable him to 
survey all the data and every causal relationship, could know how each erring human being 
would have to act at every moment if he wanted to possess the divine attribute of omniscience”.  
What are the implications?  
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Models arising from this perspective are empirical and correlational; they may provide 
explanations about the short or long term determinants of markets and oil price behavior. 
Explanations of the underlying causal mechanisms modeled are provided only in models of the 
structural or computational type. In any case, their epistemic and scientific value depends on 
their predicting power. Hence, validation is a formal process based on accuracy (Barlas and 
Carpenter, 1990). 
 
The caveat is that, to depart from wrong assumptions does not seem to be a problem for oil 
analysts and modelers if the predictions turn out right. Hausman (1992; Little, 2002) favors an 
approach where assumptions should be realistic; this entails paying closer attention to the 
institutions shaping the problem under study. Leplin (1984; Little, 2002) argues that the best 
approach for a theory to explain observable phenomena is by postulating mechanisms that 
operate in reality.   
 
Introducing System Dynamics (feedback thought): 
According to Sterman (2000), “System Dynamics (SD) is a perspective and set of conceptual 
tools that enable us to understand the structure and dynamics of complex systems”. 
 
System dynamics enables us to build computer simulation models that can be used in the design 
of better policies and organizations.  The goal of SD is to increase the understanding of an 
organization´s performance and internal structure and operating policies in connection to its 
stakeholders, and then design better policies.  
 
It has origins in nonlinear dynamics and feedback control theory. SD focuses on social systems, 
and therefore draws on economics, social psychology, and other sciences. The emphasis on 
policy making requires learning about how to effect sustained organizational change. SD 
centers its attention in the dynamics of the system under study. To do so, it aims at identifying 
the stocks and flow structures, time delays and non linearities that along the feedback processes 
are thought to cause such dynamics. 
 
SD poses that all interactions arise out of two types of feedback loops, the positive (self-
reinforcing) and the negative (self-correcting). The former tend to reinforce whatever is 
happening in the system. For example, in an oil company, finding oil reserves through the 
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production process increases the stock of reserves; this may enable more production. The latter 
tends to correct whatever is happening in the system. For example, higher oil prices may induce 
higher oil production, over time; which in turn may affect the oil price downward. These 
negative loops are self-limiting processes that seek balance and equilibrium.  
 
Mental models are important for SD, Forrester (1961; Sterman, 2000) asserts that all decisions 
are based on models, usually mental models. In SD, the term “mental model” embraces our 
beliefs about causes and effects that define how a system operates, the boundary of the model 
(which variables are endogenous and which are exogenous) and the time horizon we consider 
relevant to the problem. 
 
Research on oil markets: Few studies are listed in the literature. Nail (1972) built a model to 
study new gas resources in USA. Morecroft (1990, 2007) built a model to study the medium term 
dynamics of the oil industry; it takes into account OPEC and international oil firms, as well as 
price formation. Genta and Anderson (1994) built a strategy model for an international oil 
company to help shape future scenarios.  Mashayekhi (2001) built a model to explain 
oscillations in oil prices, and how these processes could be related to the behavior of national 
oil companies.  
 
Epistemology of System Dynamics: The focus is placed on salient features of the System 
Dynamics method: its assessment of decision making, focus on operators, endogenous 
perspective, feedback loops and knowledge. 
 
Decision making: In this perspective, the non optimizing nature of decisions by the operators 
(problem owners) is generally a given; bounded rationality is implied. This non optimizing 
element is related to Simon (1986), who claims that decision making is also framed by beliefs, 
expectations and expected utility. It is about cognitive limitations, time and cost constrains, 
and imperfect information. According to Simon (1976; Naughton, 2003) these features highly 
constrain the optimization chance of decision makers. Hence, they are prone to use simplified 
mental models to solve for complexity. 
 
Focus on operators. According to Pruyt (2006), System Dynamics entails the study of social 
systems in close interaction with the decision-makers and stakeholders. It requires all the 
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constructs used in this simulation method (variables, constants) to exist in the actual system 
under study (Forrester, 1961; Pruyt, 2006). Since knowledge search is related to the perception 
of the problem owners, causality is justified by the beliefs of the operators and modelers 
(Zolfagharian and Fartookzadeh, 2013). It is justified by theoretical constructs grasped from 
other disciplines too. This combination of causal mechanisms may end up providing a theory 
about how structure drives behavior. Given these elements, such models can be used for both 
prediction and explanation (Barlas and Carpenter, 1990). 
 
Endogenous perspective: This method departs from the belief that observed phenomena 
emerges out of the structure creating behavior. It doesn´t presuppose the existence of 
equilibrium. It assesses the social processes using an endogenous perspective. This means that 
the method requires the formulation of dynamic hypothesis that explain the dynamics of the 
problem as endogenous consequences of the feedback structure. In other words, System 
dynamics posits that the interaction of the positive and negative loops is what creates, induces 
o generates effects on the observed problem or behavior. The usage of the word “endogenous” 
in SD is primarily devoted to variables contained “within” a feedback loop that is thought to 
represent the way the system under study works in reality. 
  
Feedback loops: System Dynamicists focus on understanding the main feedback structures to 
enhance decision making (Olaya, 2009); this includes negative and positive loops; they are 
considered as integral part of the system being analyzed. The interaction of such feedback loops 
is considered responsible for observed phenomena, over time. Such loops are also thought to 
explain counter-intuitive behavior and policy resistance in social systems (Richardson, 1991). 
 
Knowledge: There is not a unified perspective about knowledge in the field of System 
dynamics. Some System dynamicists hold a realistic view, and they also engage in modeling 
in organizations; they promote organizational learning and change (Lane, 2001). For them, the 
process of model validation is continuous, and building confidence in the model built with the 
stakeholders is a cumulative process, over time; while they build a theory or provide insights 
for organizations. Other System dynamicists take a more objective view, and they focus on 
building theories based on the models they build, in order to make significant contributions to 
academia and society.  
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Oil market issues: 
From the above discussion, there seem to be some difficulties to build explanatory (referring 
to the past) or policy (referring to the future) models of the oil markets. These difficulties are 
present even in aspects that have been under scrutiny for decades, like supply, demand and oil 
price mechanisms. The equilibrium paradigm has provided laws for these three elements. The 
interpretation of these laws ranges from those in search for certainty and precision (like the 
analysts in our models review), to those that like Mises (2003) do not perceive such a degree 
of certainty in the results of the economic analysis. But, what if we raise the degree of 
complexity of the analysis? What if we now include other claims by experienced analysts about 
additional reasons affecting the supply, demand and price mechanisms? 
 
In this regard, how could we better test the following hypothesis about elements that may also 
affect the availability of oil reserves and the oil production? Can they be ignored because no 
reference to the economic concept of equilibrium is evident in them? Can these elements be 
tackled with the random walk approach? 
 
 Every oil price regime has reflected the balance of power prevailing at that time (Mabro 
2006). 
 Oil price decisions just respond to the vested interests of critical participants in the 
markets (Bridge and Le Billon, 2012: Barros, 2012; Noreng (2007).  
 Iraq´s invasion in 2001 was all about securing oil (Noreng, 2007; Greenspan (2007; 
Nell and Semmler, 2007). 
 Major players in the industry have the capacity to act in critical moments, as to block 
or permit a change (Barros, 2012). 
 History (path dependency) may shape the course of actions in the energy field; there 
are specific aspects that may lead Petro-states to poor performance in the future 
(Karl,1997; Barros, 2012). 
 Western policies aimed at securing oil supplies in the Middle-East over time, shape 
supply policies (Paul, 2002). 
 
We have agency based, history and path dependency like narratives, suitable as backstage for 
the statement made by North (1993): “institutions are not necessarily or even usually created 
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to be efficient: rather they are, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of 
those with the bargaining power to create new rules”. 
 
We now turn our attention to the definitions of “mechanisms” that may help in grasping the 
assessments that could be made of these issues, using the equilibrium paradigm and the 
feedback thought approach. 
 
Machamer et al. (2000) introduce mechanisms as complex systems which underlie behaviors. 
They state that a description of a mechanism describes the relevant entities, properties, and 
activities that link them together. They also point out that frequently, mechanisms are 
continuous processes. Cartwright (1989; Machamer et.al, 2000) add that entities have 
capacities which provide them with the “disposition to act”. For Salmon (1984; Machamer 
et.al, 2000) mechanisms are composed of processes, and interactions that create change in the 
processes, over time. 
 
Ruling paradigm, power issues: There is no consensus on the availability of mechanisms able 
to explain power interactions, other than at the narrative level. Maxwell´s (Cooper, 2008) 
Governor´s equations don´t seem to apply directly to the analysis of, for instance, western and 
Middle-East power interactions.  
 
There are no laws that describe – consistently – the struggles for oil reserves in the Middle-
East by western companies and governments; at least in the sense implied by Schaffner (1993; 
Machamer et.al, 2000), when he mentions “universal generalizations”. That is, mechanisms 
that would produce similar changes under similar conditions. 
 
Little, D. (2012) stresses the differences between natural and social phenomena, and warns 
against the availability of strong “laws of nature” describing the latter. He states that although 
there are regular mechanisms, like the decrease of infant mortality when states devote more 
resources to public health, generalizations are dangerous. According to this, there are no laws 
of exact behavior than can be applied in the analysis of power issues. This contrasts with, for 
example, Ohm´s law used to access current, voltage and resistance in electrical circuits.  
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Modeling power issues in the oil market with this paradigm would imply, then, a focus on 
predicting outcomes, without recurring to causal mechanisms creating observed behavior. The 
historic context would be explained in narrative form, and equations would provide predictions 
from the present initial conditions to the ending period of study. It would be assumed that initial 
conditions “contain” all relevant information pertaining to the problem, and that agents would 
have perfect information. The deviations from the expected, fundamental values of the 
predictions would be explained using events. These events would be exogenous; they would 
enter the analysis in the moment they occur, not before. 
 
Feedback thought, power issues: Modeling power issues in the oil market with this paradigm 
entails a focus on explanatory power, by recurring to causal mechanisms creating observed 
behavior. The underlying base would be the notion that the feedback mechanisms generate 
consequences that are spread over time and space. This is an endogenous perspective.  
 
The caveat comes with the focus on variables that must exist in the system under study. Notice 
that the power of explanation comes from a design that “replicates” past behavior. And, where 
would the structural data from a power issue like the western´s approach to Middle-East oil 
reserves come from? Was the Iraq War about the US revealed preference of dismantling 
weapons of mass destruction, or was it motivated by geopolitical and oil supply security 
concerns? (Noreng, 2007). How to model this dilemma between the western´s stated vs 
revealed preferences? 
 
However, for explanatory, non-precision oriented analysis, System Dynamics might provide a 
schema to assess the consequences of past western´s actions in the Middle-East, in the search 
for oil reserves. Take, for example, the case of the U.S. invading the Middle-East in 1973. Paul 
(2002) asserts that, a declassified British memorandum indicated that the US thought of 
launching troops to seize oil fields in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi, during the 1973 
embargo. The answer lies in path dependency. 
 
Sterman (2000) describes path dependence as “a pattern of behavior in which small, random 
events early in the history of a system determine the ultimate end state, even when all end states 
are equally likely at the beginning. Path dependence arises in systems whose dynamics are 
dominated by positive feedback processes; they can lock into a particular equilibrium”. 
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Hence, the method might shed light on the accumulation of conflicts and oil supply disruptions 
in the Middle-East; but, and here comes a caveat, would the causal mechanisms considered be 
stable enough to provide answers to most events in the region? 
 
A next caveat is related to the validation aspects posted by Barlas and Carpenter (1990). Since 
model equations in System Dynamics claim to be causal mechanisms, each one has to be 
justified. Hence, the model may be refuted if the causality in at least one of the mechanisms 
assessed is not properly supported; even if the output fits observed phenomena. The lack of 
consensus about the mechanisms that explain the power interaction conspires against this 
method. 
 
To prevent this from happening, Barlas and Carpenter (1990) suggest a relativist, functional 
and holistic approach to model validation. According to this, building confidence in the 
usefulness of a model becomes a must. Confidence is assumed to accumulate over time. 
 
Financial oil markets issues: 
Oil futures contracts are transacted by: (a) players in the oil physical supply chain, (b) financial 
players, and (c) players in search of profit or portfolio diversification. These transactions allow 
both risk diversification and speculative strategies (EI, 2006). There are divergent views on the 
effect that these financial markets have on oil price formation, in a context where prices have 
fluctuated between $150 and $29 per barrel, in the period 2008-2015. These views range from 
those that blame the activity of non-commercial traders (those without a commercial interest 
in the underlying commodity) for the oil price increase and fluctuations (US Senate, 2006), to 
those that consider that there has been no evidence of such behavior (Harris and Buyuksahin, 
2009). 
There seems to be consensus about the stable equilibrium states that can be attained in the 
consumer good markets (Cooper, 2008). However, there isn´t when it comes to capital inputs, 
asset markets.  Can the mechanisms that lead to equilibrium in consumer good markets be used 
to explain asset markets? 
 
Equilibrium paradigm, financial markets issues: This paradigm perceives that markets are 
efficient, and that they exhibit collective rationality about the value of the commodities; 
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according to this, markets prices seem to be guided to the proper and “real” value of 
commodities (Smith 2003; Richey, 2005). The underlying assumption is the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH) 
EMH assumes frictionless markets, full information availability and transparency, investor 
rationality and arbitrage (Barros, 2012). Given this, markets move naturally only toward 
equilibrium, and remain there until influenced by external events (Cooper, 2008). In this view, 
exogenous events cause markets to move; prices are therefore, unpredictable. They follow a 
“random walk”; all available and relevant information is fully and instantaneously reflected in 
the price of a market security (Barros, 2012). EMH allows for the calculation of potential future 
financial assets return Cooper (2008).   
 
In summary, EMH assumes that “market knows best”. The rational, efficient supply of 
commodities responds to the distributed aggregation of single decisions. This argument lies in 
the core of the resistance to market regulation (Richey, 2005). 
 
One caveat about EMH is that it does not consider asset price bubbles or busts; wild asset price 
swings are, accordingly, just markets responding to changing fundamentals (Cooper, 2008). As 
per this analysis, the changes in oil prices (from 154 to 29 dollars per barrel) in 2008-2015, 
have been just that, a change in fundamentals. No speculation, lack of regulation, herding or 
agency issues took place to influence price moves. 
 
Another caveat is Veblen’s (1899; Cooper, 2008) assessment about asset markets where 
demand increase with price. This is a different mechanism to that which rules the markets for 
goods and services Cooper (2008). 
 
Which mechanisms to model? EMH based or Veblen´s? EMH would argue that agents sell 
their financial assets when they perceive them to be overvalued; undervalued assets would 
attract buyers. Both mechanisms lead to different worlds.  EMH would lead to an equilibrium 
condition, Veblen’s mechanism would lead to positive feedback trading, that is, reinforcing of 
positive or negative price pressures. In Veblen´s world, then, bubbles are possible.  
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Against the equilibrium paradigm claim that exogenous events cause markets to move, Minsky 
(1992) reasons that financial markets can generate their own internal forces – an endogenous 
perspective. This is called the Financial Instability Hypothesis.  
 
From this standpoint, raising prices in financial assets (for example, oil futures) improve the 
debt to equity ratio (DER) of companies. This happens because these assets are “marked to 
market”, and the assets value increase with raising prices. Improvement in DER leads banks to 
offer more loans to companies, which they may use to buy more financial assets, which builds 
momentum for further price increases.  
 
When prices are going down, DER deteriorates and banks request further loan collaterals from 
companies, which liquidate some of their positions to comply. These selling signals build 
momentum for further price decreases. 
 
This interplay between financial agents is claimed to be a source of oscillation in credit 
(expansion-contraction) and asset prices (inflation-deflation). Hence, Minsky (1992) puts 
forward a framework where financial markets are not self-optimizing, and not in equilibrium 
(Cooper, 2008). 
 
This leads to the “lighthouse” caveat. Which side to take? EMH or else? A “disequilibrium 
approach” requires at least, a way to model and keep track of the two-way causal mechanism 
arising out of the interaction of financial players. Besides, for the two-way mechanism to 
function, information flow must be delayed, which leads to accumulation. But, accumulation 
denies the idea of random walk. 
 
Modeling financial oil futures markets with the EMH paradigm would imply that equilibrium 
would be attained through the interaction of commercial, non-commercial and financial agents. 
As efficient markets, futures values of oil contracts would show the “correct” price at all times. 
The assessment of their returns could be used safely as a guide for capital budgeting and 
allocation (Barros, 2012).  
Validation of EMH based models would be shaped by the true-false (verifiability or 
falsifiability) dichotomy arising from forecasting power. Explanatory power would not be an 
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issue. This empiricist philosophy of model validation would see validation as a 
“confrontational” process because the model is assumed to be an objective representation of 
the real system (Barlas and Carpenter, 1990). 
Feedback thought, financial markets issues: From this perspective, when analyzing financial 
markets, system dynamicists may be tempted to take into account the underlying structure in 
the financial instability hypothesis offered by Minsky (1992). According to this, there are 
forces that over time, move the activity of financial players from a conservative one (hedge 
positions to reduce risk) to positions where balance sheets are illiquid and highly leveraged 
(Minsky, 1986; Tymoigne, 2006). The dominant forces shaping this activity would be justified 
by the interaction of positive and negative feedback loops. The change in dominance would be 
triggered by accumulation processes. 
 
Working with the claimed underlying structure that creates the observed phenomena, would 
further allow the dynamicists to assess the potential for firms to engage in speculative finance 
(Tymoigne, 2006). This contrasts with the EMH approach, in which prices always reflect all 
the information available. Furthermore, several studies about the activity of oil producers in 
the futures markets show that instead of just hedging their long positions in the physical 
markets, they also use “collar” financial instruments. These collars allow for hedging activity 
and profit seeking behavior (Chique, 2014). 
 
Remarks: 
I examined two approaches for modeling oil markets power related and financial markets 
issues. Feedback thought may prove useful to access historic and path dependency issues that 
impact production and prices, over time. The financial instability hypothesis, originated from 
the same discipline as EMH, provides a new theory to access financial markets; feedback 
thought, though, seems to offer a method to tackle it within a disequilibrium perspective. 
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3.2 The Production Model and Behavior Test of Production and Investments 
 
Figure 5 presents an initial capacity model for the investment process. Stocks are measured in 
barrels per day. Rates are measured in barrels per day per year. New projects arrive to the oil 
firm’s portfolio from the investment process. The projects in the portfolio stock are those that 
the oil firm has decided to execute. However, market or financial constrains can make the 
change in portfolio negative, leading to a lower stock. This stock accrues the balance between 
the new projects and the projects that enter the construction stage, often within three years. 
Once there, it takes some time for projects to become real capacity. Lead times vary. They may 
depend on technology, project support funds, location and type oil fields and wells, and crew 
experience. Hence, the production capacity in construction stock accrues the balance between 
new construction projects, and those that are ready to produce. Capacity to produce is subject 
to loses. The later may arise out of physical (decreasing reservoir pressure, or increased water 
cut); and other factors, such as under investment, damage or sabotage (Höök et al. ,2014). So, 
the production capacity stock accrues the balance between the new production capacity rate 
and the loss rate.  
 
 
Figure 5, Starting Production Capacity Model 
 
Notice that both portfolio of projects and production capacity are drained by negative feedback 
loops. These strategic resources decrease at the rhythm of output rates. Balancing them is of 
the essence, if the oil firm desires to keep or increase production capacity.  
 
The starting model is now tested using a 10000barrels per day (BPD) impulse new project in 
the portfolio stock.  
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Figure 6, Rates response to a New Project 
 
Figure 6 presents the impulse response to a new 10000 BPD project. The new production capacity in construction emerges from portfolio of 
projects.  It takes time for upstream projects to start the construction phase. Negotiations, environmental permits and delays in partners’ decisions 
take much time. Also, terms must be met before phasing projects into existing upstream setup. Among them, that spare capacity is present; and 
that expected production matches the process, and the storage and transport systems (NPD, 2014). The new production capacity arises out of the 
stock of projects in construction. Note that construction time impacts the new capacity add ins. High construction times lowers add ins. The area 
under the black curve equals 10000 BPD, as implied by the project. Capacity loss varies with oil fields. Capacity loss in the Gulf of Mexico is 
higher than in the UK; this one is higher than in Norway; and this one is higher than in Russia; according to Bernstein Research (2013). Giant 
fields of over 1 Giga barrels (Gb) have lower decline rates than small fields, according to Höök et al. (2014).  
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Figure 7, Stocks Response to a New Project 
 
Figure 7 depicts the behavior of stocks (strategic resources). Portfolio surges with the new project, then shrinks as project portions start being built. 
Projects in construction boost while construction time holds projects in this phase. This stock takes its maximum vale when the new capacity rate 
equals the construction starts rate. At this point projects become capacity at a higher speed, and the stock sinks. Production capacity accrues the 
balance between new capacity and loses. It raises while the former is higher than the loses. It takes its maximum value when new capacity equals 
the loses. It starts declining when loses’ speed take over new capacity. It keeps dropping in the absence of new capacity out of the construction 
phase. Three stages may be seen in the shape of the production capacity stock. Growing stage, plateau stage above a threshold (i.e. above 4500 
BPD), and decline stage. 
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Figure 8, Cumulative Stocks Response 
 
Figure 8 shows the projects sequence. First, all project barrels (green line) enter the value chain in 1992. Second, all barrels have moved to the 
construction phase (blue line) three years later. That is, three times the term (1 year has been used in the test) it takes projects to leave the portfolio.  
Third, all projects in construction barrels become new production capacity (black line) after the delay implicit in the construction time. It can be 
asserted, then, that it takes around 7.5 years for projects to become capacity. That is, three times the construction time (2.5 years) used in the test. 
Fourth, capacity loss almost equals the added capacity, in the 1992-2014 period. This occurs because the oil fields time span used is 7.75 years, 
and full loss of capacity could be expected by the 23rd year, or 3 times the oil fields time span. 
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Figure 9, Cumulative Stocks Response Comparison 
 
 
Figure 9 reveals the shape of the production capacity in construction, without an outflow in this stock. This is exposed by the cumulative new 
production capacity in construction. The same happens with production capacity and cumulative new capacity. In the test, capacity never arrives 
to the intended 10000 BPD because loses prevent it from happening. As a result, knowing the stream of new capacity arrivals is not enough to 
assess where the capacity is heading to. It is essential to know how loses occur. 
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Figure 10, Net Change (end results) in Stocks (strategic resources) 
 
 
Figure 10 unfolds the interplay between end results and strategic resources. Projects in construction peak when the net change in capacity in 
construction drops to zero BPD per year. The stock declines after this, as the net inflow turns negative. Production capacity peaks when the net 
change in production capacity turns negative. The stock declines after this, as the net inflow turns negative. The shape in the capacity stock reflects 
an upstream structure subject to decline given capacity loss.  
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Figure 11, Starting Production Capacity Model with Reserves 
 
Figure 11 displays production capacity with added reserves. The model assumes that there are 
enough proved undeveloped reserves to draw from. Production cannot be enabled without 
proved developed reserves. This is the pool of reserves known to exist with at least 90% 
certainty. In addition, production facilities must exist to extract these reserves. This is where 
current production comes from. New production capacity rate signals that reserves can be 
produced during the life span of oil fields. Hence, new developed reserves are governed by the 
product of both variables. The stock is depleted by production. A small fraction of this stock 
may be bought in the market. Also, they can be re assessed or changed suddenly, as oil firms 
unveil further data about the oil fields in the production process. The net rate at which this 
stock (strategic resource) is filled up or depleted (end result) is a critical source of performance. 
It tells how many years of production are left at the current production rate. This stock is key 
in the Resource Based Lending (RBL) schema, as a collateral, to get the loans oil firms need 
to pursue their investment programs. 
 
Figure 12 offers the response of the developed reserves stock to the 10000 BPD impulse new 
project in the portfolio stock.  
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Figure 12, Reserves Response to New Project 
 
 
Figure 12 helps unfurl the upstream capacity development process. New developed reserves (access to reserves to be produced) boost the value of 
the reserves stock. The process may allow access to a number of barrels equivalent to the product of the new capacity in BPD and the oil fields 
time span. Reserves (strategic resource) sink as production depletes the stock. Maximum value attained occurs when the net change in developed 
reserves (end result) drops to zero. This signals that the outflow of the reserve stock (production) is larger than the inflow (new developed reserves).    
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Figure 13 unfolds the investment model. It now covers the decision process. Investment 
pressure pushes new projects.  The higher the pressure, more projects step up the portfolio. 
These projects become new production capacity after being constructed. This process enables, 
or ‘develops’ reserves. Upstream cost tends to slow down, as oil firms favor new projects that 
can use existing infrastructure. Without previous infrastructure, the upstream cost tends to be 
higher. They aim to extend the oil fields producing time spans. They achieve this because costs 
for modifications and new investments can be shared (NPD, 2013).  
 
Firms assess projects profits based on oil price and breakeven costs. The higher the ratio 
between the two, there may more incentives to pursue projects. This creates a pressure to invest, 
which accumulates over time; and which may be released based on various factors. First, 
willingness to invest may depend on the assessment of business context made by investors. 
Second, oil firms may decide to slow down the reserves development rhythm, or it could be 
mandated by local authorities, owners of the oil crude ‘resource’. Third, projects may exist in 
a country that belongs to OPEC, in which case, it might be recommended not to pursue new 
projects for some time. Fourth, the producer may decide that it is not in its best interest to 
increase its market share in a local or global market. Fifth, the oil firm may be partially banned 
to trade its oil in the market, as was the case of Iran, recently. 
 
The higher the investment pressure, further adjustments to portfolio and construction are made. 
This creates a reinforcing major loop which adds projects, when investment pressure raises, 
leading to higher production. However, it also tends to reinforce a declining production when 
investment pressure drops. The latter may be curtailed by the oil price to breakeven ratio. 
Hence, geology matters. It is hard for oil firms to boost production if the project’s development 
cost is high. This may be due to the nature of the oil field involved: or the quality of the oil 
crude; or the distance of the oil field to existing capacity to store and transport the extracted 
volumes. Operating costs may be high too. Extraction techniques may be outdated; or the oil 
firm may have more employees than required. The latter occurs in mismanaged National Oil 
Companies (NOC’s).   All these factor boost the upstream cost per barrel, shrinking the oil 
price to breakeven cost ratio. 
 
A major investing balancing loop tends to weaken the production raise cycle examined. Since 
oil firms tend to extract the low cost barrels first, operating costs surge as time elapses. Hence 
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upstream cost goes up as oil fields are depleted. This lowers the oil price to breakeven cost 
ratio. This leads to lower investment pressure, smaller projects, capacity and production; 
leaving oil price as a key factor. It may raise the oil price to breakeven cost ratio and enable 
projects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
49 
 
 
 
Figure 13, Production Model with Decision Process. 
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Projects adjust as in Figure 14. How much to adjust capacity arises out of the product of 
investment pressure and current capacity, with an adjustment time. Pressure values above 1 
create capacity rate add-ons; values below 1 do not. This creates the capacity reinforcing loop. 
Capacity add-ons drive a goal oriented adjustment in construction. The tune up is made as to 
have enough projects in the portfolio given the projects lead time. Hence, the correction equals 
the indicated change in capacity times the construction time; minus current capacity in 
construction, in a year. This change goal for the construction rate is then used to obtain the size 
of the portfolio. Given that there may be more projects in the portfolio than needed, a further 
change is made. Change in portfolio equals the goal minus the current value of the stock, in a 
year. Projects enter and leave the portfolio this way. A bigger portfolio implies add-ons to 
construction, new capacity, and capacity. 
 
Figure 14, Capacity loss and Adjustment to Projects in Portfolio and Construction. 
 
The portfolio balancing loop prevents it to take values beyond its goal. The projects in 
construction loop prevents this stock to go beyond the desired value. That is, the value of the 
capacity stock required to adjust capacity, given the lead, or construction time. The capacity 
loss loop drains this strategic resource, over time, at the rhythm of the oil fields time span.  
 
Figure 15 unveils the full production and investment model.  
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Figure 15, Production Model with Investments. 
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Figure 16 presents the model response to an assessed price to breakeven ratio equal to 0.8 until 
2001, and 1 afterwards. 
 
Figure 16, Model Response to Price to Breakeven ratio 
 
The stocks now have initial values. Production Capacity and Projects Portfolio 73: BPD; 
Production Capacity in Construction: 31 BPD; and Developed Reserves: 122 million barrels 
(MMB). The assessed price to breakeven ratio is set to 0.8 in the 1992-2001 period. It is set to 
1 afterwards. Initially, Projects flow from the portfolio to the in construction stock. The former 
drops and the latter raises. The 1992 peak of projects in construction translates to production 
capacity in 1995, after the construction time (2.75 years). Developed Reserves step up too, as 
new production capacity has been created. Production gets higher than new developed reserves, 
making the net change in reserves negative. At the same time, capacity loss gets higher than 
the new production capacity, making the net production capacity rate negative. Production 
sinks.  
After this transient, both net production capacity and reserves rates remain negative while the 
assessed oil price to breakeven ratio is smaller than 1 (2001). Then, then investment pressure 
starts to rebuild as it takes its new value (1). The Project portfolio and production capacity in 
construction stocks grow as more projects are pursued. Yet, this does not translate into a 
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positive net production capacity or reserves rate. The lead time to build capacity and develop 
reserves holds the new barrels until 2004. Note, again that the construction time is set to 2.75 
years. Net inflow to the production capacity and developed reserves stocks becomes positive 
in 2004. Those are the end results of the growth policy tested. Capacity and reserves stocks of 
strategic resources start to grow.  
Growth in both stocks, at almost a constant rate (or slope in the figure) is consistent with a net 
inflow or end result that is positive and constant or almost constant.  This can be verified by 
looking at the net change in both stocks in the figure. 
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Investments: 
The oil production life cycle may be divided in four stages. Discovery and evaluation of fields, 
development of capacity to produce, production, and abandonment. Upstream investments 
refer to development costs. The other unit costs are bundled into the model variable “E&P cost 
per barrel”.  
Development implies planning and building actions. Among them: drilling wells according to 
objectives; using adequate techniques to recover, separate and treat fluids and gases inside the 
reservoirs; building facilities to support production activities (i.e., platforms), storage and 
transport systems; and integrating new facilities with existing ones. 
 Investments are appraised in the model.  They arise out of the new production capacity in 
construction rate, the upstream cost per barrel and the oil fields time span. A surge in any of 
the three variables may step up desired investments. The model assumes that the oil firm has a 
prudent financial management. It means that it has the money required by investments; usually 
50% is financed with new debt. Figure 17 reveals the investment cycle impulse response to a 
10000 BPD new project. Notice (year 1993) that 37% of investment is made without any 
capacity being productive yet. Also (year 1994) a 4000 BPD capacity is active (40% of total), 
with 60% of the total investment. 
 
Figure 17, Financial Investment. 
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  Model Equations: 
 
𝒖𝒑𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒎 𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒍 =
𝑀𝑎𝑥 (𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙, 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 ∗
𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙 ∗
𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠
)   (1) 
Development cost of reserves to create production capacity. The initial cost is escalated by the 
cera capital index. This index tracks the costs of equipment, facilities, materials, and personnel 
used in the construction of projects. The sample is a geographically diversified portfolio of 
onshore, offshore, pipeline and LNG projects. It offers a benchmark for tracking a complex 
and dynamic environment (HIS, 2015). The index is thought to signal rent seeking actions by 
steel, cement and materials supply firms; oil field services firms; and states that grant drilling 
and production licenses (ETA, 2014). Upstream cost tends to be lower in the presence of 
previous infra structure and developed reserves. It tends to be higher as oil fields are depleted 
and production accrues. Operators usually produce low costs reserves first. Units: USD (2015) 
per barrel. 
 
𝒃𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏 = (𝐸&𝑃 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙 + 𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙 +
𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙) ∗ (1 + ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑙𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)    (2) 
Summary of costs used in the evaluation process. E&P cost per barrel refers to exploration and 
production costs. Fiscal outflow is the government’s take per barrel. It is a fraction of the boe 
price (fiscal percentage * boe price). As oil firms produce oil and gas, boe denotes “barrels of 
oil equivalent”. Hurdle rate is the minimum return on investment expected by the oil firm. This 
low return may be linked to higher capex; and the restore of declining high return legacy assets 
with higher cost, higher taxed projects (ETA, 2014). Units: USD (2015) per barrel. 
 
𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝑻𝒐𝑩𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒌𝑬 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 =
𝑏𝑜𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛
       (3) 
Profit indicator per barrel. The higher the ratio, more projects may be pursued. Unitless. 
 
𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝑻𝒐𝑩𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒌𝑬 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 =
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑇𝑜𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐸 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜, 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒)     (4) 
Average PriceToBreakE ratio, as perceived by the oil firm, in the assessment time. Unitless. 
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𝒏𝒆𝒘 𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆 = (𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑇𝑜𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐸 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)/1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 (5) 
Input to the investment pressure stock, in one year. Units: per year. 
 
release time = Max (min investment release time, base investment release 
time/cera capital index)        (6) 
Captures the aversion and constraints of investors to pursue projects. A high release time 
depletes the investment evaluation pressure stock sooner; leading to smaller production 
capacity projects. Low release time values signal willingness of investors (or lack of 
constraints) to pursue projects. It is assumed that a high cera capital index leads to less projects 
since it tends to reduce the expected profit, and investors may pursue other opportunities in 
non-oil projects. 
 
𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑬𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆 =  ∫  (𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 −
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) ∗ 𝑑𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒(0)  (7) 
Accrues the balance between new investment pressure and pressure release. The latter seeks to 
capture the aversion and constraints of investors to pursue projects. Unitless. 
 
𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒂𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(0, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗
(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 − 1))/(𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒)) (8) 
Capacity increase as indicated by investment evaluation pressure. Adjustment is made over 
the number of years specified. Units: Barrels per day BPD per year 
 
Indicated adjustment in construction rate 
= Max (0, (indicated adjustment in capacity rate*construction time-
production Capacity in Construction)/1 year        (9)
           
Indicated adjustment in new production capacity in construction rate. Adds projects to the 
portfolio and in construction stocks to match the required capacity rate. Notice that the 
change takes into account the lead time to build new capacity. Units: BPD per year. 
    
 
𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒐 = (𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑟)/ (1 year) (10) 
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Projects in portfolio to sustain the required construction rate. Units: BPD. 
 
change in portfolio 
 = (indicated projects in portfolio – Projects in Portfolio) / 1 year            (11) 
Portfolio balance. Adds projects to portfolio or removes them, to match the new construction 
rate. Units: BPD per year. 
 
new production capacity in construction rate 
 = Projects Portfolio / (1 year)                        (12) 
Sixty-five percent of projects in portfolio are assumed to start construction within one year. It 
is assumed that all projects start construction within three years. Units: BPD per year. 
 
new production capacity rate 
= Delay Material (new production capacity in construction rate, 
construction time, delay type=3, initial value= production Capacity in 
Construction/construction time)               (13) 
New production capacity in place. It is the result of the upstream construction process. The 
Delay Material function returns the 3rd order exponential material delay of new production 
capacity in construction rate, using an exponential averaging time given by the construction 
time, and an initial value given by production Capacity in Construction/construction time. A 
material delay is a delay resulting from the time necessary to process physical material. Units: 
BPD per year. 
capacity loss rate 
 = Production Capacity / oil fields time span         (14) 
Loss in the capacity to produce. It is assumed that an existing capacity of an oil field would 
lose 65 % of its capacity to produce in the oil field time span. Units: BPD per year. 
 
Projects Portfolio 
= ʃ (change in portfolio-new production capacity in construction rate)*dt 
+ Projects Portfolio (0)           (15) 
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Accrues the balance between changes in the portfolio and the new projects being built. Units: 
BPD. 
 
 Production Capacity in Construction 
= ʃ (new production capacity in construction rate – new production capacity 
rate)*dt + Production Capacity in Construction (0)     (16) 
Accrues the balance between the new projects being built and those that are completed. Units: 
BPD. 
 
 
New developed reserves rate 
= new production capacity rate * oil fields time span     (17) 
Oil and gas fields are prepared to be produced over a time span. Creating new capacity to 
produce implies having access to reservoirs during such period. New developed reserves reflect 
this operating assumption. Units: Barrels per year (BPY). 
 
Production rate 
= Production Capacity * production fraction      (18) 
Once capacity is installed, operators tend to produce at maximum capacity. However, there 
may be reasons to produce at a lower capacity. First, the resource owner may have a policy to 
deplete reservoirs at a lower rhythm (for instance, 97%) to avoid wells damage. Second, a 
fraction of the reserves may be perceived as to have more value in the future, leading to a 
production fraction lower than 100%. Third, a group of oil firms (i.e., NOC’s in OPEC) may 
decide to impact prices by decreasing the production fraction, possibly leading to higher oil 
prices. Four, an oil firm with enough market power to influence prices (i.e., Saudi Aramco) 
may decide to have spare capacity to stabilize the market in case of supply disruptions. Units: 
Barrels per day (BPD). 
 
Developed Reserves 
= ʃ (new developed reserves rate – production rate)*dt + Developed 
reserves (0)         (19) 
Accrues the balance between the new developed reserves and production. Units: Barrels. 
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Cumulative production 
= ʃ (production rate)*dt + Cumulative Production (0)       (20) 
Accrues production. Units: Barrels. 
 
investments 
= Delay Material (new production capacity in construction rate * upstream 
cost per barrel * oil fields time span, delay time = 2 years, delay type=1, 
initial value of investments at start of simulation)                      (21) 
Cash flow view of how financial investments are paid. Units: USD (2015) per year. 
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Behavior testing: 
The model is tested with oil & gas upstream activities. The goal is to understand the factors 
that govern production and the investment needed for production capacity. The sample includes 
a small international oil company (Murphy Oil, or MUR); a large international company 
(ExxonMobil, or XON); and a large oil region (Norway). Focus is placed in production 
capacity, developed reserves and investments. Data for the 1975-2014 period is gathered from 
the Securities and Exchange Commission annual 10-K reports, and the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate. A barrel of oil equivalent basis (boe) is used for oil price and production. The latter 
includes natural gas, crude oil, condensate and natural gas liquids. Six thousand cubic feet of 
natural gas equals one barrel of oil. 
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3.2.1 Murphy Oil: 
MUR Oil has operated in USA, Canada, United Kingdom, Ecuador, Malaysia, Australia, 
Brunei, Vietnam, Indonesia, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Suriname, Republic of the Congo, 
and Namibia.   Total worldwide 2015 production was 208 thousand boe per day (MBD).  
 
Figure 18, Murphy Oil Simulated Vs Historical Production 
 
Figure 18 displays MUR’s simulated values. The results follow the trend in historical 
production. Yet, simulated values are higher in certain periods. Possible reasons for this may 
be found in MUR’s annual 10-K reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission (MUR, 
2016). In the year 2000, liquids production in USA dropped 21% due to non expected declines 
(capacity loss in the model) in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM); lower share of production in Canada 
due to maintenance down time; and a production fall in Ecuador due to transportation 
constrains. In 2003, production in the U.K. was down 20%, due to sale of oil fields. In 2006, 
worldwide liquids (crude oil, condensate and natural gas) production dropped 13% due to 
major maintenance in Canada; declines in USA; along with a worldwide drop of 17% in natural 
gas, due to sale of fields in GOM. In 2007, natural gas production dropped 19% due to declines 
in GOM. 
 
Most of the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that production reductions are driven 
by geological problems. Not by commercial reasons only. Thus, production capacity may be 
constrained by the above listed geological problems. 
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Figure 19, Murphy Oil Simulated Vs Historical Developed Reserves 
 
Simulated reserves are higher than historical. In 2006, Access to reserves could have been 
curtailed, given the worldwide drop of 17% in natural gas production, due to sale of fields 
property in GOM Notice that reserves values may be affected by revisions. They allow changes 
in previous reserves estimations as new exploration and production efforts are made. Better 
geologic or production data may be collected leading to revisions. Proved reserves volumes 
previously thought of as economically feasible to produce may return to unproved status with 
low oil prices. 
 
Figure 20, Murphy Oil Simulated Vs Historical Cumulative Upstream Investments 
 
The model matches the cumulative upstream investments very well, in the study period (23 
years). Investment is computed as the product of new production capacity in construction, 
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upstream cost per barrel and oil fields time span. Thus, these variables seem to take plausible 
values in the period of study. This effort has been made in a context of rising capital 
expenditures (capex) and falling capex productivity. Capex per barrel stepped up 10 times from 
1999 to 2013, compared to the 1985-1999 period (ETA, 2014).   
 
 
Figure 21, Murphy Oil Simulated Breakeven Costs 
 
This poses risks. Breakeven costs were above USD 60 per barrel in 2014, and WTI price is 
USD per barrel in December 2016. The price to break even ratio is low, curtailing investments. 
As a result, Moody’s Investor Services downgraded the firm’s debt notes, reducing the firm’s 
credit to below investment grade status.  The ability of the firm to fund operations has been 
downgraded (MUR, 2016). 
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3.2.2 ExxonMobil 
XOM operates upstream in 40 countries in the five continents. It controls 1800 fields and more 
than 50000 production wells. Total worldwide 2015 production was 4000 thousand boe per 
day (MBD). 
 
 
Figure 22, ExxonMobil Simulated Vs Historical Production 
 
 
The model matches the historical production in the study period (23 years).  Simulated values 
are higher in the 2008-2009 period. Likely reasons for this can be found in XON’s annual 10-
K reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission (XON, 2016). In the year 2008, total 
boe production fell 6%, due to assets seizure in Venezuela, divestments and lower take in 
shared efforts.  
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Figure 23, ExxonMobil Simulated Vs Historical Developed Reserves 
A fraction of reserves may be purchased too. XOM purchased 9 billion barrels of developed 
reserves in 2009. This has been modeled as an impulse function that raises both new developed 
reserves and investments, in that year. Although all reserves bought add to the stock in the 
same year, this capital cost was not completely paid in 2009. Thus, the investments variable 
contains a payment delay structure where 67% of the purchase is paid within three years. 
The rationale for this deal may start with the oil price context at the beginning of 2009. WTI 
Price has fallen from USD 145 to USD 30 per barrel, in six months. Mabro (1986) asserts that 
lower oil prices reduce revenues, raising unpaid taxes and debt. They also reduce the value of 
oil inventories in the balance sheet assets account. Equity and access to credit are reduced. This 
creates further cash flow problems that increase bankruptcy risk. At the same time, less 
exploration efforts slow down development of new fields and reserves accrual. This may 
reduce production. It might also lead to transfer of producing assets from firms in problems to 
those with strong balance sheets. 
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Figure 24, ExxonMobil Simulated Vs Historical Cumulative Upstream Investments 
 
The model matches the cumulative upstream investments very well, in the study period (23 
years). Investment is computed as the product of new production capacity in construction, 
upstream cost per barrel and oil fields time span. Thus, these variables seem to take plausible 
values in the period of study. 
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3.2.3 Norway Region 
Oil and gas operations in Norway are included. Data source is the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate (NPD). 
 
Figure 25, Norway Simulated Vs Historical Production 
 
The model matches the historical production in the study period (42 years). Production peaked 
in 2003. It can be seen from Figure 26, that net production capacity rate is zero in 2002. That 
is, capacity loss gets higher than new production capacity rate in that year. Notice that oil prices 
increased afterwards, leading to lower than potential revenues. 
 
Figure 26, Norway Net Production Capacity Rate 
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Figure 26, Norway Simulated Vs Historical Developed Reserves 
 
The model has a similar pattern to the historical developed reserves in the study period (42 
years). Developed Reserves arise out of the new production capacity rate, which peaked in 
2001. However, the peak in reserves occurs later (after 2003). This delay is related with the 
reserves stock, since it accrues the difference between new developed reserves and production. 
The model computes the peak in reserves after 2003, which is the moment when production 
gets higher than new developed reserves. 
New ventures are on its way in this region, even in the presence of 2016 low oil prices of 50 
USD per barrel. For instance, small operator Lundin, with 32 MBD of boe production and 
operating costs near 12 USD per barrel (as computed by the model for the region), has agreed 
to take a RBL facility. 
This resource based lending facility aims to fund development of the Johan Sverdrup field 
through to first oil. It is a seven years, USD 5 billion facility, supported by 23 international 
banks, with grace period of five years. This may bring support to the idea of investment 
pressure being driven not only by average expected profit per barrel, but also by availability of 
capital to pursue projects. 
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Figure 27, Norway Simulated Vs Historical Cumulative Upstream Investments 
 
The model matches the historical investment in the study period (42 years).  Higher upstream 
costs per barrel are thought to be the main reason of higher investments. As can be seen in the 
next figure, average breakeven has raised 2.7 times since 2003, to 80 USD per barrel. 
 
Figure 28, Norway Breakeven Costs 
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Table 1. Parameters used in the model 
Name Murphy 
Oil 
ExxonMobil Norway Units 
Construction time 2.5 3 4 years 
Delay Type in new production capacity rate 3 3 3 Unitless 
Oil fields time span 7.75 10 9.9 years 
Initial upstream cost per barrel 6.80 4.50 5 USD per barrel 
Hurdle rate 10 10 10 % 
Fiscal percentage relative to boe price 15 22 45 % 
Price to breakeven ratio assessment time 1 1 2 years 
New capacity adjustment time 1.5 1 2 years 
Base investment pressure release time 1.65 1.54 1.52 years 
Minimum investment pressure release time 1.51 0.93 1.15 years 
Initial Projects Portfolio 72800 1300000 850200 BPD 
Initial Production Capacity in 
Construction 
30800 1300000 220200 BPD 
Initial Production Capacity 72800 4231833 189500 BPD 
Initial Developed Reserves 121.7 13200 2600 Million 
Barrels 
Initial Cumulative Production 0 0 0 Barrels 
Initial Investment Evaluation Pressure 0.3 1 3.5 Unitless 
Initial investments 195 11205 5600 Million USD 
per year 
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3.3 The International Demand Model and Behavior Test of Production 
 
 
Slight changes are made to the production model to adapt it to the analysis of the international 
oil market. This focus implies computing the demand not satisfied by production in net 
importer regions (OECD and Asia Pacific, as defined by the US Department of Energy). It is 
stated in this study that the Asia Pacific region’s adjustment in construction rate responds also 
to changes in capacity loss. It is also asserted that OPEC also responds to changes in the 
international market demand; that is, the net volume required by importing regions, beyond 
their production.  
 
 
𝒖𝒑𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒎 𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒍 =
𝑀𝑎𝑥 (𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙, 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 ∗
𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗
𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠
)             (1a) 
 
 
A cost fraction is included to account for distinct cost impact. This is a value between 0 and 
1, where 1 has the highest impact. Units: USD per barrel. 
 
new production capacity in construction rate 
 = indicated adjustment in construction rate                                 (12a) 
Portfolio of projects stock is no longer used, as it not deemed essential.  New production 
capacity in construction rate is now equal to indicated adjustment in construction rate.  Units: 
BPD per year. 
 
E&P cost per barrel was an exogenous variable before. Now, it is computed as: 
 
E&P cost per barrel = initial upstream cost per barrel * cera capital index                (22) 
It allows the cost to escalate with the cera capital index. Units: USD per barrel. 
 
Investment pressure release time is set as a constant (k), to reflect a broader international 
market. Units: years. 
 
release time =  k                  (23) 
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k = constant. Units: Years. 
 
Indicated adjustment in construction rate 
= capacity loss adjustment +Max (0, (indicated adjustment in capacity rate*construction 
time-production Capacity in Construction)/1 year                                                     (9a)
           
Capacity loss adjustment equals 0 for OECD and OPEC, it is only a computed value in the 
case of the Asia Pacific region. Units: BPD per year.  
 
The one-year adjustment time in indicated construction rate has been changed in the OECD 
case. From 1986 to 1993 it is a convex function with an initial value of 3 and a final value of 
0.5 years. It remains with this value until 2015. 
 
 
Capacity loss adjustment[AP] 
= MAX (0, 1.35*AVERAGE (capacity loss rate[AP], 1 year, initial value = 0) - indicated 
adjustment in capacity rate[AP])                                                                  (24) 
 
Capacity loss adjustment for Asia Pacific will be equal to the difference between capacity loss 
and the indicated adjustment in capacity rate, only when the loss is higher. Units: BPD per 
year. 
 
 
Indicated adjustment in capacity rate [OPEC] 
 
= MAX (0, MAX (international market demand -PRODUCTION                 CAPACITY 
[OPEC], Production capacity*(Investment Evaluation Pressure[OPEC]-1)) /new capacity 
adjustment time[OPEC])          (8a) 
 
Adjustment in production capacity rate now responds to the maximum value between the 
indicated by the investment pressure and the market. This means that OPEC may adjust its 
capacity up when the international market grows, beyond investment pressure. This behavior 
suggests a learning effect. Prior to 1986, OPEC reduced its production in the search of higher 
prices and the result was a loss of market share. Recent actions by Saudis within OPEC 
reveal that losing market share is not in their plans. Units: Barrels per day BPD per year 
 
International market demand is now introduced. 
International market demand 
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= Demand[OECD] + Demand [AP] – production [OECD] -production [AP]            ( 25) 
It equals the import needs of major importing regions OECD and Asia Pacific. OPEC and 
Rest of the World are net exporters. Units: BPD 
 
Figure 29, Demand model 
 
 
In this demand model, changes in base demand are driven by the reference demand, changes 
in GDP and demand fraction. The latter has been a matter of national policy in OECD and Asia 
Pacific, for a long time. It means that this fraction has been decreasing as policies destined to 
lower consumption have been put in place. These policies have come along with a general raise 
in the use of renewables. This has not been the case in the OPEC region, where subsidized fuel 
creates incentives for higher consumption. The encounter of reference demand and annual 
production governs the import needs of the regions. OECD and Asia Pacific regions are 
assumed to enact stronger policies when the change in their import needs raises (Mabro, 1984). 
That is, when the magnitude of the energy problem boosts, the change in demand fraction may 
be lower. Hence we have two main loops in the model. First, a reinforcing loop going from 
demand to reference annual demand and indicated demand; and a balancing loop that lowers 
the demand fraction when the import needs boost. A lower demand fraction may lead to lower 
indicated demand, which after an adjustment time may shrink demand. GDP change governs 
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indicated demand as growth calls for larger energy needs. On the other side, increases in 
production rates within the regions lower their import needs. 
 
 
change in base demand rate 
= (indicated demand – demand)/adjustment time change in demand            (26) 
Units: BPD per year      
 
Reference annual demand 
= AVERAGE (Demand, 1 year)                (27) 
Units: BPD per year      
 
Demand 
= ʃ (change in base demand rate)*dt + demand (0)                       (28)
                                                    
Accrues changes in base demand rate. Units: BPD 
 
Import needs 
= MAX (0, AVERAGE (Demand-production, 1 year) )            (29) 
Greater than zero for OECD and Asia Pacific, net importers. Units: BPD 
 
Change in import needs 
= (import needs/Initial (import needs)                       (30) 
Change relative to starting date (1986). Units: Unitless. 
 
Change in demand fraction 
= net importer switch *     (   (1/  change in import needs) - Demand Fraction) 
/adjustment time  demand fraction            (31) 
An upturn in import needs speeds up the drop in demand fraction, given the adjustment time. 
The net importer switch allows the change in import needs to act only on OECD and Asia 
Pacific regions (importers); OPEC’s demand fraction is a fixed value. Units: Unitless. 
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Demand Fraction 
= ʃ (change in demand fraction) *dt + Demand Fraction (0)        (32)                     
Accrues changes in base demand fraction. Units: BPD 
 
 
Indicated demand 
= reference annual demand * (1 + historical GDP change )* Demand Fraction       (33) 
Collects the impact of GDP and Demand Fraction on the reference demand. Units: BPD. 
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3.3.1 OECD Region 
 
 
Figure 30, OECD Simulated Vs Historical Demand 
 
The simple demand model captures OECD demand behavior over the 1986-2015 period. 
Notice that demand starts to descend in 2007, as policies destined to lower consumption trigger 
descent. Yet, the slope of the demand curve changes by 2009; the rhythm of descent is slower 
than before. This may be linked to the rate of change of import needs for the region. As seen 
in the next figure, production boosts after 2008, due to a surge of US production.  
 
 
Figure 31, OECD Simulated Vs Historical Production 
 
The next figure displays the simulated import needs of the OECD region. The steep drop may 
support the idea that regions may, to some extent, relax enforcement of oil consumption 
reduction policies when the change in their import needs drops. 
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Figure 32, OECD Simulated Import Needs 
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3.3.2 Asia Pacific Region 
 
 
 
Figure 33, Asia Pacific Simulated Vs Historical Demand 
The model only captures the general trend of oil demand in the Asia Pacific region, led by 
China. As expected, OPEC targets this region, given its relative importance in the market. The 
next figure displays simulated production in the region without correction for capacity loss.   
 
Figure 34, Asia Pacific Production without Correction for Capacity Loss 
Production is lower when driven only by the investment pressure as modelled. Now, the 
correction for capacity loss is included, and production gets close to the pattern of historical 
values. 
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Figure 35, Asia Pacific Simulated Vs Historical Production 
Hence, it is asserted that when confronted with indicated changes in new capacity rate lower 
than recent capacity loss, operators decide for the higher value.  They may do this because the 
mix of production capacity factors and delays involved may shrink capacity, over time. The 
next figure depicts the adjustment, in BPD per year. 
 
Figure 36, Asia Pacific Simulated Capacity Loss Adjustment 
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3.3.3 OPEC 
 
 
Figure 37, Simulated Vs Historical Demand in OPEC Countries 
 
Figure 37 depicts simulated demand in OPEC countries. It matches historical values. This 
demand has tripled in the last thirty years; probably because of gasoline subsidies and lack of 
policies to lower oil consumption and higher use of renewables.  
 
 
Figure 38, OPEC Simulated Vs Historical Production 
 
Simulated production follows the general patter of historical behavior. This is the simulated 
response to two drivers. First, the Investment pressure that emerges out of the expected oil 
price to breakeven relation. Second, a policy to pursue additional projects when the 
international market grows. 
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Figure 39, OPEC Production Vs International Demand 
   
The figure unfolds simulated values of the international market demand, and OPEC’s 
production. The former signals how many barrels per day are not covered by net importer 
regions (OECD and Asia Pacific). In this result, OPEC over produces international demand 
until 2001; oil prices were very low in this time period. After 2001, OPEC produces at a much 
lower rate than demand; prices set up in this period. In 2014, OPEC starts producing more than 
demand; prices dropped. 
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Table 2. Parameters used in the model 
Name OECD Asia 
Pacific 
OPEC Units 
Construction time 6 4 4 years 
Delay Type in new production capacity rate 3 1 1 Unitless 
Oil fields time span 10 13 15 years 
Initial upstream cost per barrel 5 7.1 3.5 USD per 
barrel 
Hurdle rate 10 10 10 % 
Fiscal percentage relative to boe price 48 45 50 % 
Price to breakeven ratio assessment time 2 1.5 1 years 
New capacity adjustment time 1 1.4 1.5 years 
Base investment pressure release time Na. Na. Na. years 
Minimum investment pressure release time Na. Na. Na. years 
Release time 1 1.04 1.02 years 
Initial Projects Portfolio Na. Na. Na. BPD 
Initial Production Capacity in Construction 7500000 2020200 12500800 BPD 
Initial Production Capacity 21097511 5000000 15871000 BPD 
Initial Developed Reserves 77006 18250 57929 Million 
Barrels 
Initial Cumulative Production 0 0 0 Barrels 
Initial Investment Evaluation Pressure Na. Na. Na. Unitless 
Initial investments Na. Na. Na. Million 
USD per 
year 
Demand Fraction 1.02 1.01 1 Unitless 
Net importer switch 1 1 0 Unitless 
Adjustment time demand fraction 32000 170000 275 days 
Adjustment time change in demand 480 150 325 days 
Demand 37.5 5.2 3.3 Million 
Barrels 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
4.1) Summary of Findings: Expected profit per barrel and market share may stand as main oil 
production and investment drivers. DPM provides a powerful method to assess the causal 
interplay between drivers and oil supply strategic resources. To use it, however, it is crucial to 
identify the main elements in the value chain. I have built a general model of such a structure, 
taking into account the production capacity in construction, the production capacity, and the 
developed reserves as main resources. The latter seems to be a better structural element than 
the reserves used in the literature. I pose that new project development costs may decrease as 
reserves are developed and new infrastructure is in place. This differs from studies where 
reserves are not differentiated. Notice that this has led to a production assessment in diverse 
regions of the world, which is similar to historical values. Hence the dynamic model that has 
been built may be used in supply oil studies to identify policies to lessen problems like the 
fluctuations in oil revenues of OPEC countries. 
        
4.2) Contribution to Existing Knowledge:  This study contributes to the literature in 
investments, petroleum and system dynamics, by integrating the three fields.  
   
4.3) Limitations of the Research: A longer time is needed to assess properly the data on 
upstream financial investments for OECD, Asia Pacific and OPEC. Getting this data would 
help to validate further the financial investment results obtained for Murphy Oil, Exxon Mobil 
and Norway.   
     
4.4) Directions for Further Research: To test the oil price model formulated in the theoretical 
part of this thesis; and use it to test OPEC policies. 
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APPENDIX: DPM of PDVSA  
 
DYNAMIC PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
OF THE VENEZUELAN NATIONAL OIL COMPANY 
Presented at the Conference: The Paradigm Shift from Output to Outcome Measures in the 
Public Sector and the “Azienda Pubblica” May 2016, University of Palermo, Italy 
 Omar Chique, PhD Candidate, University of Palermo 
 
1) INTRODUCTION 
1.1) Problem Relevance 
PDVSA, the Venezuelan National Oil Company (NOC) generates approximately 85 percent of 
the country's total export revenue. Its proved oil reserves increased from 80 to 280 billion 
barrels five years ago, due to additions in the Orinoco Belt. The number of remaining years of 
production at the prevailing production rate passed from 70 to 255 years. In the meantime, the 
price of WTI oil went from 26.18 $/barrel in 2002 to 99.67 $/barrel in 2008; the average price 
in the period 2008-2014 was 88.74 $/barrel. Notwithstanding, a plan to increase production 
capacity to 5.8 MMBD (million barrels per day) by 2012 achieved only 3.1 MMBD; and oil 
production decreased 10% in the last five years. Fiscal proceeds to the state also show a decline 
pattern. We use the Dynamic Performance Management (DPM) framework (Bianchi, 2012) 
and we also integrate elements of institutional and policy analysis to find what causes the 
performance of this oil company. Using DPM, we confirm that end results, strategic resources 
and drivers must be synchronized over time to provide sustainable growth. This oil case uses 
three strategic resources: proved reserves, production capacity and financial availability. We 
also estimate that the solidarity policy aimed at providing cheap oil to Caribbean neighbors 
caught disproportionate attention in the agenda of policy makers, whereas the deterioration of 
the financial and operational conditions of the oil company did not. The Dynamic Model of 
Choice for Public Policy (Baumgartner and Jones, 2005) was used to explain the change in the 
institutional agenda that led to focus on the solidarity policy from 2007 on. As Bianchi et al. 
(2010) put it, ignoring the political priorities that permeate through the institutional system may 
lead to incomplete analysis of its corresponding organizational structures. 
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1.2) Research Question and Objective  
Research Question: What has been the impact of the solidarity policy put in place by PDVSA 
on its performance? In particular, what has been the impact on the cash received by the 
government from the oil company? 
Research Objective: 
To develop a dynamic, causal explanation that associates structural factors with the 
performance of PDVSA during 1999-2014, in order to assess the impact on the cash received 
by the government from the oil company. 
1.3) Paper Outline 
In order to provide a dynamic causal explanation of the performance of PDVSA, the second 
part of the paper examines the relevant theory and conceptual framework. We introduce the oil 
markets, performance and previous system dynamic models of interest. Then we present 
relevant institutional and policy constructs that interact with the operation of National Oil 
Companies (NOC´s). The section ends with the introduction of the conceptual analysis 
framework used in this research: Dynamic Performance Management, introduced by Bianchi 
(2012). The third part justifies the DPM analysis of PDVSA; the required performance 
elements are selected, a system dynamics model is built; a DPM assessment is made, and 
simulation results are discussed in light of the institutional and policy dynamics literature 
presented.  The fourth part presents a brief summary of the findings, contributions, limitations 
of the research, and directions for future research. 
2) RELEVANT LITERATURE AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
2.1) Performance and Dynamic Models of the Oil Industry  
Oil is sold using supply contracts or in the spot market. Oil price formulas are generally pegged 
to the price of reference –benchmark- crudes, plus a price differential that reflects the quality 
of the crude oil on sale, relative to the benchmark. This differential, which is calculated by each 
producer should reflect differences in the refined products obtainable (Fattouh, Mabro, 2006). 
Spot prices are generally used as reference to estimate future cash flows; key determinants of 
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investment in production capacity projects. WTI (West Texas Intermediate), Brent and Dubai-
Oman are the major crude oil benchmarks in the current price regime; almost all crude markets 
outside America and the Far East use the Brent reference. WTI is the benchmark for crude 
imported to the U.S; most of the crude oil futures contracts traded worldwide are referenced to 
WTI. The Dubai-Oman is used as a reference for the Gulf crudes (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, 
UAE, Qatar and Kuwait) sold in the Asia-Pacific market (Fattouh, Mabro, 2006). 
 
In addition to the spot market for immediate physical transactions, different markets have 
developed for oil transactions: the "forward" market for transactions made several months 
before the delivery of cargos, organized futures contracts exchanges, transactions over the 
Internet, and OTC –over the counter- trades for tailored transactions. The availability of 
forwards and futures transactions allows both risk diversification and speculative strategies (EI, 
2006). The future value of a benchmark is based on several factors, among which are the cost 
of money, the current level of excess commercial inventories of crude oil, the cost of storage, 
and the general perception about future supply. It is said that prices in a market are in 
"contango" when it is estimated that the futures price will be higher than the spot, and it is said 
to be in "backwardation" if the expectation is that the futures price will be lower than the spot 
(EI, 2006). 
Oil exploration efforts generate new proved reserves. These reserves are depleted by 
production. Oil companies tend to produce the more profitable barrels first. Projects for new 
production capacity must compete with other projects in the portfolio. Minimum project 
requirements are: availability of reserves for the life span of the reservoir(s); a verifiable 
demand for the production; profitability in the investment, and financial availability. Other 
considerations include environmental, political and economic context studies. 
 
Production capacity represents the highest level of stable and economically efficient production 
that can be achieved from a reservoir. It takes years for the development wells and 
infrastructure to be set up, before the commercial operation of the new production capacity can 
be initiated. This increases risk. Mabro (1986) asserts that lower oil prices reduce revenues, 
increasing unpaid taxes and debt; this reduces access to credit, creating further cash flow 
problems that increase bankruptcy risk. This may trigger reductions in exploration efforts that 
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slow down the accumulation of reserves and the development of new fields. This may lead to 
a decrease in production.  
 
National Oil Companies (NOC´s) control about 80% of world oil reserves. As in any profit 
seeking company, their performance can be measured via market capitalization, reserves and 
production distributions, as well as financial indicators. However, Government´s oil policy 
may result in different strategies in the case of NOC´s (Victor, 2007). Thurber et al. (2011) 
measure – in the case of NOC´s - how effective are the upstream operations in generating the 
revenue needed to satisfy the short term and long term objectives of the government. 
 
Different dynamic energy and oil models exist in the literature. Naill (1972) studied the main 
factors controlling the discoveries of new gas resources in the U.S., assuming finite resources, 
and taking into account resource utilization goals in the short and long term. He studied the 
effect of government policies - such as price regulations and tax incentives - on the behavior 
of short and medium -term rates of discovery and resource production.  His dynamic model 
included initial levels of gas reserves, investment in exploration, resource price, revenues, 
proved reserves, demand and production. He stated that the interaction of these variables over 
time was not intuitively obvious. 
Morecroft (2007) designed a model to study the long-term dynamics of the global oil industry; 
he focused on the representation of the behavior of oil producers. It contains five key sectors: 
(a) flexible OPEC producers with capacity to handle significant changes in production policy; 
(b) opportunistic OPEC producers; (c) OPEC quotas; (d) independent producers, which 
represent the rest of the producers; and (e) price and market demand. Price is set according to 
the imbalance between supply and demand; demand is obtained according to the short and long 
term influence of price, growth in GDP, and other non-economic elements. In this model, 
profitability per barrel enables production capacity in construction, which then becomes 
production capacity after the construction time, enabling production; operating and capital 
expenditures increase as the availability of resources decrease, as in the Naill (1972) study; this 
last aspect is of significant value from an operational point of view.  
Genta and Anderson (1994) created a model to analyze future scenarios to support the strategy 
of an oil corporation. They studied a scenario of global stability where NOC´s take greater 
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control of their operations and production, over time.  The influence on price and world's oil 
supply was then assessed. The availability of capital for projects is included too. 
Mashayekhi (2001) designed a model to explain the oscillatory behavior of oil prices; he 
suggests that when prices rise, the financial resources of the oil-exporting nations increase in 
the short term, while their need to export oil decreases temporarily; this leads to a decrease in 
the supply of oil and consequently, to a price increase over time; however, this increase would 
reduce demand in oil importing countries, over time. 
 
Sterman (1981) studied the relative importance of the interconnections between energy and the 
economy; he created a platform for evaluating the effects of rising energy prices on economic 
growth, inflation and other key economic and energy indicators. It is based on an explicit theory 
of behavior on decision-making by individuals and firms at the microeconomic level. 
 
Dyner (1990) developed an integrated energy policy model that initially considered the energy 
system of the United Kingdom; the model was used to analyze issues related to the volatility 
in the electricity sector and the strategic possibilities of arbitration through the gas and 
electricity markets. 
 
2.2) Institutions, Policies and National Oil Companies 
According to Pieters and Pierre (1998) Institutions refer to rules, values, norms and practices 
that shape or constrain political behavior. They claim that attempts to understand observed 
behavior independent of the structure will only lead to biased descriptions of individual 
motives. Institutions are flexible. As North (1990) points out, institutional change arises out of 
the relationship between: (a) institutions and the organizations that evolve from the incentives 
provided by the former; and (b) the feedback process where policy makers and entrepreneurs 
react to available opportunities. He postulates the existence of a threshold value that triggers 
institutional change, out of the perception of policy makers and entrepreneurs that to change is 
in their best interest. 
Windfalls are defined as revenues in excess of expectations (Hildreth, 1998; Wilson and Sylvia, 
1993).  Oil producing states experienced high oil prices in the last decade. Several responses 
to windfalls are presented in the literature. Policy makers could isolate the windfall from 
conventional budget by creating funds. However, depletion of the funds may lead to increased 
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vulnerability. Depletion of funds reacts to politician´s desires to build coalitions. Under these 
circumstances, budgeting becomes chaotic. This leads to relaxation of authority and managerial 
responsibilities in the budgeting process, as dominant coalitions form to control the allocation 
of the funds (Levine et al., 1981; Wilson and Sylvia, 1993). According to Jones and Weinthal 
(2010), among the reasons for economic stagnation in oil dependent economies we have the 
Dutch disease, where non mineral sectors reduce competitiveness and collapse; and the effect 
of export windfalls on corruption and indebtedness. The authors claim that beyond that, it is 
the structure of ownership (degree of participation and relationship between public and private 
oil operators) that they choose to manage their mineral wealth what matters most. It shapes 
incentives for subsequent institution building. In particular, it affects the type of fiscal regime 
that emerges and hence the prospects for building state capacity and achieving long term 
growth. 
According to Jones and Baumgartner (2005; Jensen et al., 2016) policy making is not 
neccesarily incremental; that is, information processing is not proportional, but disproportional. 
They claim that policy makers, in response to information from the environment, pass from 
under-reaction to overreaction. This is called the Dynamic Model of Choice for Public Policy 
(DMCPP). Changes in the environment, that might require changes in policy, are sometimes 
ignored, primarily, because of bounded rationality and agency concerns. However, these 
ignored signals do not necessarily vanish. They build up pressure that may produce policy 
action in the future. This implies that the response of policy makers to these signals do not 
always adjust smoothly; they may become bursts of changes once attention to these previously 
ignored signals is granted. In this model, then policy response is not always synchronized with 
signals from the environment. The authors claim that signals require strength beyond certain 
dynamic threshold to deserve special attention. New signals must “compete” with the existing 
agenda. Notice the accumulation process in the response: when the signal strength is below the 
threshold, the response is partial and proportional to the signal; over time, response pressure 
builds until the threshold is reached, and the response is proportional not to the instantaneous 
value of the signal, but to the accumulated value of it. 
 
2.3) Conceptual Framework: Dynamic Performance Management (DPM)  
Bianchi (2012) proposes a framework to study performance (in terms of a dynamic flow, or 
change in strategic resources in a period of time) and sustainable growth in organizations. The 
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strategic resources (built over time, to help their sustainability) are defined as stocks that have 
accumulation and depletion rates, therefore defining performance as the net between these two 
rates. Performance is conceptualized as the net rate of increase of the strategic resources. It is 
the responsibility of the policy makers to identify the proper strategic resources that lead to 
success; guarantee that the strategic resources are kept at the appropriate levels, over time; and 
keep the strategic resources consistently balanced, over time. Initially, the framework calls for 
an objective view of organizational performance where the products, services and relationships 
with the external environment are defined, and an internal and external value chain map is 
defined, as well. Then, an instrumental view of organizational performance is taken, where 
improvement mechanisms are made explicit; the end results and their respective drivers are 
identified; and every responsibility area, in charge of influencing the drivers, must nurture the 
appropriate strategic resources; all of which must be consistently balanced, over time, at the 
organizational level. A subjective view of performance requires linking the goals and 
objectives of the organization with the performance measures. 
This approach provides a solid framework for the oil industry because upstream and financial 
managers carry actual responsibilities to configure the portfolio of projects that lead to 
enhanced proved reserves and production capacity; appropriate liquidity in terms of cash 
availability; and sustainable equity growth; required not only as a shareholder´s return signal; 
but also as an enabler of the external financial resources (loans) that oil companies require to 
pursue their capital projects. It is also the responsibility of managers to keep the proved 
reserves, production capacity, cash and equity at appropriate levels, over time. Most of all, high 
level management strives to keep formal track of the balance of resources, over time. 
 
3) METHODOLOGY AND SIMULATION RESULTS     
       
3.1) Rationale for Adopting Methodological Approach:   
 
The research objective is to develop a dynamic, causal explanation that associates structural 
factors with the performance of PDVSA during 1999-2014; in order to assess the impact on 
the cash received by the government from the oil company. As noted in the previous section, 
DPM fits properly to analyze oil companies; therefore, we use it in the research, concurrently 
with its underlying representation, simulation and testing method System Dynamics (SD).  The 
latter may help to understand what factors cause the observed behavior, over time, in an 
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organization, while providing a causation theory of behavior Lyneis (1980). A model of the 
PDVSA upstream oil operations is developed. We center our attention on the proved reserves, 
production capacity and financial availability strategic resources. We also make an explicit 
representation of the government policy to delay the collection of a fraction of accounts 
receivables. This solidarity policy aimed at Caribbean Countries was triggered by the increase 
of oil prices in the last decade. We show how the cash received by the government from the oil 
company decreases over time, in spite of high oil prices. 
 
3.2) DPM: The case of PDVSA Reserves, Production, and Financials 
Figure 1 shows the inter-relationships that make possible three fundamental end results in the 
PDVSA upstream operations: 
 
 Change in proved reserves: It is the result of the addition of new reserves via 
exploratory efforts, and the subtraction of reserves (depletion) via production. 
 Change in production capacity: New production capacity is added when projects 
start producing. Natural and mechanical effects create, concurrently, capacity loss. The 
change is the difference between the two. 
 Change in financial availability: Financial availability is an approximation to cash 
and equivalents. Hence the change is an indication of the net cash flow of the company.  
 
The accompanying strategic resources are the following: 
 
Proved Reserves Strategic Resource: Accumulates the changes in proved reserves. This 
enables the “current reserves relative to required” driver. The latter, along with the expected 
profit and the verifiable demand help in the definition of the desired indicated capacity. Notice 
that the “expected profit relative to benchmark” driver increases with higher oil price, lower 
tax rate, or lower (benchmark) return rate; it decreases as production accumulates over time, 
since oil companies tend to extract (or produce) the cheaper barrels first.  
 
Production Capacity Strategic Resource: The indicated production capacity signals the new 
production capacity rate that needs to be built. It generates new projects in the portfolio. These 
projects, in turn, create projects under construction. These projects are built according with the 
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construction time. However, it is the financial availability that allows the construction of 
projects, once “indicated”.  This means that in the presence of financial restrictions, the new 
projects under construction would be fewer than without restrictions. Once built, projects 
become new production capacity, increasing the production capacity strategic resource. The 
latter enables production 
Financial Availability Strategic Resource: The two main sources of cash are the collection 
of account receivables (AxR) and new debt. The payment of Debt (capital and interest) and 
commitments deplete this strategic resource. Since the company requires a certain level of cash 
to pay for the average outflow, indicated amounts of debt are generated. The latter may be 
constrained by the current debt to assets ratio; hence the cash level may be lower than the 
indicated. The stock of commitments accumulates pending payments of capital expenditures, 
field costs and all pending payments to government (taxes, bonuses, royalties, and other 
outflows). Notice that the solidarity policy implemented in the last decade implies delaying the 
collection of a fraction of AxR. 
 
A feedback perspective: 
 
Capacity growth loop (reinforcing): Higher (lower) indicated capacity leads to more (less) 
projects in construction. More (less) projects in construction leads to more (less) production 
capacity (after the construction time). Given lead times for new production capacity and 
capacity loss – which increases with production capacity- oil companies strive to increase 
indicated capacity; unless lack of profitability, proved reserves or demand indicates otherwise. 
 
Development costs loop (balancing): Development costs increase as production accumulates 
- Companies develop cheap barrels first; this decreases profitability of projects, indicated 
capacity, projects in construction, new production capacity and production capacity. This, in 
turn, decreases production. 
 
Reserves depletion loop (balancing): Production depletes proved reserves. Lower reserves 
relative to required lowers profitability of projects; indicated capacity, projects in construction, 
new production capacity and production capacity. This, in turn, decreases production. 
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New reserves loop (reinforcing): Higher exploratory efforts increase proved reserves; this 
increases reserves relative to required; profitability of projects increases as well as indicated 
capacity, projects in construction, new production capacity and production capacity. This, in 
turn, increases production, accounts receivable (AxR) and collections; this increases financial 
availability, leading to further exploratory efforts. 
New reserves loop (balancing): Higher exploratory efforts increase proved reserves; this 
increases reserves relative to required; profitability of projects increases as well as indicated 
capacity, projects in construction, new production capacity and production capacity. This, in 
turn, increases commitments, leading to higher payments of commitments and depletion of the 
financial availability, decreasing –balancing- exploratory efforts. 
 
Investment loop (reinforcing): Higher (lower) financial availability may lead to more (less) 
projects in construction. This leads to higher (lower) new production capacity and production 
capacity. This, in turn, increases (decreases) production, accounts receivable (AxR) and 
collections. Financial availability increases (decreases), leading to more (less) projects in 
construction. 
 
Investment loop (balancing): Higher financial availability may lead to more projects in 
construction. This leads to higher new production capacity and production capacity. This, in 
turn, increases commitments, leading to higher payments of commitments and depletion of the 
financial availability, reducing –balancing- projects in construction. 
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3.3) Results and discussion: 
 
 
Figure 2, Simulation of Proved Reserves 
 
The net incorporation of reserves changes the strategic resource from 80 to 280 billion barrels 
during the study period, due to additions in the Orinoco Belt. The number of years of production 
at the prevailing production rate passes from 70 to 255 years. The magnitude of the proved 
reserves, although important, is not sufficient to generate an increase in production capacity 
and production. The simulated values are consistent with observed behavior. 
 
 
Figure 3, Simulation of Production Capacity 
 
The net incorporation of capacity made the strategic resource decrease 10% in the period of 
study. The price of WTI oil went from 26.18 $/barrel in 2002 to 99.67 $/barrel in 2008; the 
average price in the period 2008-2014 was 88.74 $/barrel. Production capacity decreases in the 
presence of sustained high oil prices. The company published in its web site a plan to increase 
production capacity to 5.8 MMBD (million barrels per day) by 2012; it achieved 3.1 MMBD. 
The financial availability strategic resource constrains growth in production capacity. The 
simulated values are consistent with overall observed behavior.  
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Figure 4, Simulation of Financial Availability 
 
The financial availability strategic resource decreases in the presence of high oil prices. The 
solidarity policy – triggered by high oil prices in 2007 - that delays collection of a fraction of 
accounts receivables helps deplete the resource. In the presence of diminished financial 
resources, the company delays payments to contractors, further increasing the stock of 
commitments and future outflows that constrain financial availability even more. Concurrently, 
the increase in commitments weakens the debt to assets ratio. New loans become scarce and 
more expensive to obtain, again, impacting availability negatively. 
 
 
 
Figure 5, Simulation of Commitments 
 
The stock of commitments increases as availability stagnates and then decreases. The average 
collection time of contractors increases. Payment delays increase commercial risk of 
contractors, therefore increasing costs to the oil company, that reflect on the stocks of 
commitments over time, again increasing future outflows and deterioration of the financial 
availability strategic resource. 
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Figure 6, Simulation of Bank Debt and Government Take 
 
Bank debt increases when oil prices increase, it then stagnates as new loans become scarce and 
costlier. Annual cash to government peaks and starts declining with financial availability. The 
simulated values are consistent with overall observed behavior. 
 
The case shows the potential consequences of the lack of institutional mechanisms to prevent 
relying heavily on the mineral sector and high spending policies; as indicated by Jones and 
Weinthal (2010). The situation may worsen in the presence of a commodity shock, as 2015 
shows. The institutional mechanisms that may control the ability of the state to tax and spend 
do not seem to be synchronized with the performance of the oil company. In any case, the 
solidarity policy did not arise out of technical reasons. The institutional framework existent at 
the time decided the rules to allocate the associated oil proceeds, as suggested by the World 
Bank (2007) in cases of high oil rents. 
As theorized by John and Margetts (2003) the solidarity with the Caribbean agenda gathered 
momentum once the government had enough impetus to implement it. The political image was 
high, and the oil prices increased enormously, actually creating a windfall. Once decided in 
2007, the program expanded in a non-linear fashion. It did not look as an incremental process; 
rather, it gained disproportionate attention from policy makers that same year, as posited by 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993; John and Margetts 2003). The observed behavior of policy 
makers seems compatible, then, with the Dynamic Model of Choice for Public Policy 
(DMCPP) stated by Baumgartner and Jones (2005). 
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The disproportionate attention obtained by the solidarity program contrasts with the lack of 
action to cope with the deterioration of the financial fundamentals of the oil company; and the 
lack of risk mitigation strategies against an oil commodity shock, or price reduction.  
Baumgartner and Jones (2005) postulate that policy makers are frequently biased; government 
bought the idea that the era of cheap oil prices was over. Activists with political positions close 
to the government supported the idea with public documents, including books. Experienced 
analysts alerting that high oil prices would favor also international oil companies, increasing 
supply and decreasing prices later on, were ignored. 
4) CONCLUSIONS         
 
4.1) Summary of Findings 
 
DPM shows that once identified the end results, strategic resources and drivers; they have to 
be synchronized over time to provide sustainable growth. This oil case has been built relying 
on three strategic resources: proved reserves, production capacity and financial availability. 
The last two show decaying patterns while the first grows enormously without leveraging the 
other two to achieve the expected production of 5.8 MMBD by 2012. On the contrary, 
production decreases 10% and cash to government shows sustained decline. The solidarity 
policy caught disproportionate attention in the agenda of policy makers, whereas the 
deterioration of the financial and operational conditions of the oil company did not caught it at 
the same speed. The Dynamic Model of Choice for Public Policy (DMCPP) was used to explain 
the change in the institutional agenda that led to focus on the solidarity policy from 2007 on. 
As Bianchi et al. (2010) put it, ignoring the political priorities that permeate through the 
institutional system may lead to incomplete analysis of its corresponding organizational 
structures. 
      
4.2) Contribution to Existing Knowledge       
 
Based on empirical evidence about the upstream oil industry in Venezuela, this study 
contributes, first, to the dissemination of the Dynamic Performance Management framework 
proposed by Bianchi (2012); second, it provides a reference application of the framework at 
the inter-institutional level, specifically by providing an endogenous perspective of the links 
between the operational and financial aspects of an oil company, and the institutions that shape 
and constrain its behavior and performance. 
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4.3) Limitations of the Research        
 
Only public information about the oil company was used. No group model building effort was 
performed. 
 
4.4) Directions for Further Research         
 
To analyze OPEC using this framework for a better understanding of policy making in NOC´s, 
oil supply and oil prices. 
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